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SUBORDINATION AND THE FORTUITY OF OUR
CIRCUMSTANCES
SergioJ. Campos*
The antisubordination principle exists at the margins of equality law. This Article
seeks to revive the antisubordination principle by taking a fresh look at its struc-
ture and underlying justification. First, the Article provides an account of the
harm of subordination that focuses on one's position in society, rejecting the focus
on groups popular in the existing antisubordination literature. Second, it argues
for a theory of state obligation that goes beyond both the existing state action doc-
trine of the Equal Protection Clause and the failure to protect doctrine associated
with Charles Black. The Article argues instead that the antisubordination princi-
ple mandates affirmative action due solely to the existence of subordination,
regardless of its causes. Third, the affirmative action required by the antisubordi-
nation principle requires preferential treatment that burdens innocent persons.
Rather than defend affirmative action on past discrimination or diversity
grounds, the Article argues that these sacrifices are justified given the arbitrary na-
ture, or fortuity, of the circumstances into which we are born. Unlike John Rawls
and other philosophers who have recognized this fortuity, but have argued that it
only implicates what persons are entitled to, the Article instead argues that this
fortuity provides the basis for a solidarity with those born into subordinated posi-
tions. Because anyone could have occupied positions of subordination but for the
accident of birth, we all have reason to make reasonable sacrifices to end subordi-
nation.
INTRODUCTION
The antisubordination principle exists at the margins of equality
law. The antisubordination principle, or at least the fragments of
such a principle, first surfaced in the Warren Court's efforts to
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make Brown v. Board of Education' a reality.2 The goal was to dis-
mantle the vestiges of the Jim Crow caste system, both in public
schools and in life. These efforts continued into the early years of
the Burger Court3 but remained couched in terms of discrimina-
tion.' The Court continued to view subordination as primarily a
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. These efforts are too numerous to cite, so I only highlight a few examples. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (requiring local authorities to implement the
principles articulated in Brown "with all deliberate speed"); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) (applying Brown to Washington, D.C. segregated schools via the Fifth Amendment);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (affirming court order enjoining Arkansas officials from
undermining desegregation efforts); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invali-
dating "freedom-of-choice" desegregation plan as inadequate under Brown /and suggesting
a principle of creating functionally unitary school districts). Of course, the Court expressed
antisubordination values in contexts outside of school desegregation. See, e.g., Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down state laws prohibiting miscegenation). Also, some
Court decisions that could only be understood as antisubordination decisions predated
Brown, most famously Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (invalidating racially restrictive
covenants on land). Moreover, in the years between Cooperv. Aaron and Green, Congress took
action with an antisubordination cast: (1) Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 241 (enacting antidiscrimination laws in employment and public accommodations);
(2) Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (enacting measures to ensure
voting rights of blacks and other minorities); (3) Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
284, 82 Stat. 81 (prohibiting discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of housing).
Even the executive took a somewhat antisubordination attitude during this time. See Exec.
Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1,977 (Mar. 8, 1961) (mandating that federal contractors
"take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are
treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin"
(emphasis added)).
Of course, this history is too rich to recount in one footnote, and the literature on this
era is equally voluminous. For examples of more comprehensive histories of Brown and sub-
sequent civil rights activity, see MICHAELJ. KLARMAN, FROMJIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 363-442 (2004), HUGH DAVIS
GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY: RACE AND GENDER IN AMERICAN POLITICS
1960-1972 (1992), and J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME
COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 (1979).
3. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding
that district court order of forced busing to remedy past school desegregation was a permis-
sible exercise of court's equity power); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
(holding that, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, employment criteria that have a ra-
cially disparate impact were only permissible if a "business necessity."); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.
1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (holding that desegregation plans could permissibly apply to areas
where only de facto, and not de jure, segregation was present); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S.
284 (1976) (holding that a remedial order against Housing and Urban Development for
Fifth Amendment and Civil Rights Act violations in Chicago housing can extend beyond city
territorial borders).
4. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 22 ("The constant theme and thrnst of every holding from
Brown I to date is that state-enforced separation of races in public schools is discrimination
that violates the Equal Protection Clause."); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (Title VII "proscribes not
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion." (emphasis added)); Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208 ("[W]e hold that a finding of intentionally
segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case,
creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventi-
tious."); Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 291-92 (allowing a remedial order that extended beyond city
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by-product of discrimination, and, consequently, focused on dis-
crimination as the constitutional evil. When confronted with the
antisubordination principle directly, in cases where either
(1) subordination extended beyond discriminatory state con-
duct,5  (2) subordination arose from nondiscriminatory state
conduct,6 or (3) discriminatory action, such as affirmative action,
was used to alleviate non-state-caused subordination , the Court
rejected the antisubordination principle altogether." The Court
instead opted for a narrow antidiscrimination interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause. 9 Today the antisubordination prin-
ciple exists almost0 exclusively in scholarship," with little hope of
borders since "there was evidence of suburban discrimination and ... the likelihood that
there had been an 'extra-city impact' of the petitioner's 'intra-city discrimination' ").
5. E.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that remedy for intra-district
school segregation cannot extend beyond district lines); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (holding that where the adoption of a desegregation plan
had established a racially neutral system of student assignment, district court exceeded au-
thority in enforcing order to remedy segregation caused by residential patterns).
6. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (finding that "disparate impact" ra-
tionale of Griggs does not apply to the Equal Protection Clause).
7. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (subjecting medical
school affirmative action program to strict scrutiny).
8. In fact, the Washington v. Davis decision came out literally weeks after the publica-
tion of the first comprehensive attempt to articulate the antisubordination principle, Owen
M. Fiss's Groups and the Equal Protection Clause. 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). For a discus-
sion of the history leading to the Court rejecting the antisubordination principle, see Reva
B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles
overBrown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004).
9. E.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 ("[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a
law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory pur-
pose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact." (emphasis
omitted)); Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ("'Discriminatory purpose' ...
implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that
the decisionmaker... selected ... a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,'
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." (footnote and cita-
tion omitted)). For a criticism of Feeney's "because of" standard, see Reva Siegel, Why Equal
Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv.
1111, 1134-46 (1997).
10. I say "almost" because there are some aspects of statutory equality law that have an-
tisubordination elements. Along with the civil rights statutes I discuss in note 2 above, I
would also include the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12110-12213 (2000). See
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability", 86 VA. L. REv. 397 (2000) (apply-
ing the antisubordination principle to interpretation of "disability" under Americans with
Disabilities Act); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1415 (2007) (applying the antisubordination principle to the disability con-
text). Others argue that even some Equal Protection precedents contain some
antisubordination elements. SeeJack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights
Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination ?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10-11 (2003).
11. E.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 117 (1979) (arguing that courts should examine "whether [a]
policy or practice ... integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a de-
prived position because of gender status); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
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influencing the Court. 2 In fact, the Court has made clear that the
antidiscrimination principle reigns supreme. The Court has moved
far away from Justice Blackmun's view that "[i] n order to get be-
yond racism, we must first take account of race."'13 Instead, the
Court has embraced the view that " [t] he way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race."
4
This Article does not document the rise and fall of the antisub-
ordination principle, but rather takes stock. It seeks to take a fresh
look at the antisubordination principle at the level of principle, all
in an attempt to clarify and re-interpret certain aspects of its un-
derlying structure and justificatory basis. In particular, the purpose
of this Article is to distinguish the antisubordination principle
from the dominant antidiscrimination interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause and most equality law.
The antisubordination principle primarily differs from the anti-
discrimination principle in the perspective it takes. Unlike the
antidiscrimination principle, which focuses on how the state treats
individuals, the antisubordination principle examines the structure
of society. The antisubordination principle's primary concern is
with how institutions and informal practices in society impact the
various social positions persons inhabit.
This Article first argues that the antisubordination principle's
structural perspective leads to a distinct theory of the harm of sub-
ordination. Subordination arises when persons are in social
positions that are (1) ascriptive, (2) difficult, if not impossible, to
exit, and (3) otherwise morally irrelevant to one's life prospects. In
LAW § 16-21 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing in favor of an antisubjugation principle);J.M. Balkin,
The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 (1997) (arguing against subordination); Ruth
Colker, Anti-subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003
(1987); Fiss, supra note 8; Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44
STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991) (arguing against subordination and status-race); Jed Rubenfeld, Af-
firmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 461 (1997) (arguing in favor of an anti-caste principle);
Siegel, supra note 9 (arguing against subordination and status hierarchies); Cass R. Sunstein,
The Anticaste Principle, 92 MIH. L. REV. 2410 (1994) (proposing an anti-caste principle). A
recent symposium held on Fiss's Groups article discusses the antisubordination principle in
great detail. Symposium, The Origins and Fate of Antisubordination Theory, ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002, http://bepress.com/ils/iss2. Finally, the antisubordination prin-
ciple has broad support from critical race theorists. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes et al.,
Introduction to CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 1-2 (Francisco
Valdes et al. eds., 2002) (noting critical race theory's focus on "sociolegal webs of domina-
tion and subordination.").
12. There are pockets of hope. Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003), has antisubordination elements that the Court has not completely rejected.
See infra Section I(B)(2)(c). More encouraging is Justice Breyer's recent dissent in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, which provides an unabashed de-
fense of racial integretation. See 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2820-24 (2007) (BreyerJ., dissenting).
13. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun,J.).
14. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. at 2768.
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providing this account of subordination, the Article develops the
concept of a social position as the proper subject of the antisubor-
dination principle. The concept of a social position shifts the focus
away from the aggregative nature of groups, which is popular in
the existing literature,'5 and, instead, focuses the principle on the
social structure itself, in particular the positions that the social
structure constructs.
The antisubordination principle's structural perspective also
leads to a distinct theory of state obligation. This Article argues
that under the antisubordination principle, the obligation of the
state is not predicated on state wrongdoing, as the Supreme Court
has insisted,' 6 but on a commitment by society to eradicate all
structures of subordination, regardless of the state's role in the
creation or maintenance of those structures. The antisubordina-
tion principle, therefore, bases the liability of the state on the
simple existence of subordination. No more is required. The prin-
ciple's structural perspective, moreover, broadens the options
available to the state to remedy subordination.
The antisubordination principle not only describes an ideal, but
also asks individuals to make reasonable sacrifices to realize it.
These sacrifices create a tension between the antisubordination
principle and the antidiscrimination principle. The antisubordina-
tion principle will require affirmative action that presumptively
violates the antidiscrimination principle since it gives preferential
treatment to those subordinated.
In addressing this tension, the Article acknowledges but forgoes
two common strategies. One strategy centers on history, and fo-
cuses on the fact that affirmative action only burdens groups that,
historically and in the aggregate, are unjustly advantaged in soci-
ety.' 7 But this response ignores the particular harm the
antidiscrimination principle targets. The antidiscrimination prin-
ciple does not look at the historical or aggregated position of
similarly classified persons in society,' but looks solely at the
15. The most obvious proponent, of course, is Owen Fiss. See Fiss, supra note 8, at 124-
27. For a further discussion on the focus on groups in the antisubordination literature, see
infra Section I(A) (2) (a).
16. E.g, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989) (discussing
reqtirements for remedially-based affirmative action); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149 (1987) (same).
17. See, e.g., STEPHANIE WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREF-
ERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996); Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and
the Future of Civil Rights Scholaiship, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 993, 1005-23 (1989).
18. This view is most associated with Justice Brennan. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 363 (Bren-
nan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[R]elief [from past discrimination] does
not require as a predicate proof that recipients of preferential advancement have been indi-
SPRING 2008]
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individual discriminated against. The harm, to borrow a term from
Justice O'Connor, is "personal." 9 The antidiscrimination principle
powerfully asks why any person should be recognized as more or
less worthy by the state on the basis of classifications like race, even
if he or she is, on the whole, advantaged by that classification.
The Article also forgoes the strategy of looking for second-order
justifications for affirmative action, such as diversity.20 Such a strat-
egy is not only dubious in some contexts,2 but it also obscures the
concern with subordination that motivates affirmative action. It
falsely suggests that affirmative action serves a different principle
altogether.
The Article argues instead that resolving the tension between
the antisubordination and antidiscrimination principles requires
fully developing the normative basis of our obligation to take af-
firmative action to end subordination, a basis that more clearly
delineates the tension between the two principles.
The Article finally argues that the antisubordination principle is
based on an acknowledgement of the fortuitous nature of the cir-
cumstances that order our life prospects and personal welfare
when we are born into society. Because, but for these natural and
social circumstances, any person could have occupied any place in
society, persons have a reason to make sure that any person's posi-
vidually discriminated against; it is enough that each recipient is within a general class of persons
likely to have been the victims of discrimination." (emphasis added)). This view is also most asso-
ciated with proponents of reparations for slavery and the overt discrimination that
exemplified the Jim Crow era. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the
Reparations Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 279, 284 (2003) ("The issue of race-
based reparations concerns a fundamental issue of social justice... : the responsibility that
the community as a whole shoulders for the enslavement of and continuing discrimination
against African Americans." (emphasis added)).
19. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (government use of race subject to
strict scrutiny "to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been
infringed" (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))); see also
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("The rights created by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights estab-
lished are personal rights.").
20. This view is most associated with Justice Powell. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 ("The
... goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a diverse student body. This clearly is a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education."); Grutter, 539 U.S. at
306 (upholding Bakke's diversity rationale); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 269 (2003)
(same); see also Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke 's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1745,
1746 (1996) (arguing in favor of "the importance of democratic dialogue and diversity in
public universities" that affirmative action fosters).
21. See Owen M. Fiss, Affirmative Action as a Strategy ofJustice, 17 PHIL. & PUB. POL'V 37,
38 (1997) ("The diversity rationale seems shallow, for it lacks the normative pull necessary to
justify the costs inevitably entailed in a system of preferential treatment. The rationale has
little appeal once we move outside the university context, for example, to the realm of pro-
duction workers or guardrail contractors.").
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tion in society is not determined by aspects of the person that (1)
are imposed, (2) are difficult, if not impossible, to exit or avoid,
and (3) are irrelevant from a moral point of view. The fortuity of
our circumstances, in other words, grounds a solidarity we have
with those subordinated. It therefore provides a basis for imposing
sacrifices on persons to eradicate the subordinating effects of our
born-into circumstances, and furthermore explains under what
circumstances these sacrifices justify state discrimination.
The Article proceeds in two Parts. The first Part discusses the
structure of the antisubordination principle, in particular the prin-
ciple's theory of harm and its theory of state obligation. The
second Part discusses the justification of the antisubordination, in
particular, how the fortuity of our circumstances provides a basis
for affirmative action. The Article concludes with a brief discussion
of the relationship between the antisubordination principle and
welfare rights.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ANTISUBORDINATION PRINCIPLE
This Part describes the structure of the antisubordination prin-
ciple. In order to understand the antisubordination principle,
particularly how it differs from the antidiscrimination principle,
one must distinguish between two social perspectives.
The first perspective, a transactional perspective, focuses on the
treatment of persons by the state. The antidiscrimination principle
takes this perspective. The second perspective, a structural per-
spective, focuses on social conditions and how these conditions
affect persons in society. The antisubordination principle takes this
perspective. I refer to these perspectives as perspectives because
they represent different ways of looking at social phenomena. Nei-
ther perspective defines the only way of looking at things, just a way
of looking at things. Certain things emerge to the foreground
while others recede to the background as one changes perspective,
22as if focusing a camera.
22. I want to make a brief note about terminology. I borrow the term "transactional"
from both legal and philosophical literature. Under a transactional perspective the focus is
on "a discrete alteration of the status quo between the plaintiff and defendant, localized in
time and space." Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J.
1311, 1318 (2002); see also ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 153 (1974) (de-
scribing his transaction-based entitlement theory as "historical; whether a distribution isjust
depends upon how it came about."). The term "structural," in turn, is synomomous with
legal or philosophical approaches that are systematic, outcome-based, or consequentialist in
nature. Whereas the transactional perspective is concerned with the historical treatment of
one party by another, the structural perspective is concerned with the consequences that
SPRING 2008]
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The two perspectives differ subtly, sometimes insignificantly. In
Brown v. Board of Education,3 for example, nothing turned on
whether the distinct harm to black school children under the
Topeka dual school system was the process of racial assignment
(transactional) or the resulting racial isolation (structural). Both
were present; in fact, one (state discrimination) caused the other
(state segregation) .24
However, it is important to keep both perspectives distinct, for
two reasons. First, each perspective defines a distinct theory of
harm. Under a structural perspective, the general harm is a pro-
hibited social condition, and the first Section will describe the
more specific harm of the antisubordination principle as the exis-
tence of subordinated social positions. In contrast, the general
harm under a transactional perspective is an unauthorized way of
treating persons by the state, and I will describe the specific harm
of the antidiscrimination principle in more detail in the next Part.
In some instances both a transactional and structural harm can
flow from the same social phenomena, as I noted in Brown above,
but each type of harm can arise independently. State discrimina-
tion does not always entail subordination, and vice versa.
Second, each perspective defines a distinct theory of state obli-
gation. This is not to say that the "state" is different under each
perspective. The state is the state-sometimes an enemy, some-
times a friend, but always an agent of the people. Rather, each
theory posits a different basis for (1) when the state should inter-
vene and (2) the scope of that intervention. In general, the
transactional perspective bases state obligation on state wrongdo-
ing. The state should intervene when it is responsible for the
underlying harm. Moreover, the transactional perspective con-
strains the scope of that intervention to remedying the individual
victims harmed by the state's wrongdoing.
arise from the social structure. See, e.g., Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS
WELFARE 5 n.8 (2002) (noting consequentialist character of their welfare economic ap-
proach); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1979) (noting
that structural reform litigation like Brown focuses "not on particular incidents or transac-
tions, but rather upon the conditions of social life and the role that large-scale organizations
play in determining those conditions.").
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. This basic point is made in Owen M. Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of
the Law, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 155, 155-56 (Marshall Cohen et al.
eds., 1977); see also Fiss, supra note 8, at 170-71 (distinguishing between first-order situa-
tions, where discrimination and subordination overlapped, second-order situations, which
involved disparate impact cases, and third-order situations, where discrimination and subor-
dination conflict, as in affirmative action).
592 [VOL. 41:3
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Under the structural perspective, however, the state should in-
tervene whenever a prohibited social condition exists. The goal is
not to correct wrongdoing, but to reorder society, and for that rea-
son the state's obligation to remedy subordination is
fundamentally a societal, public, obligation to do so. In addition, as
I will argue in more depth below, the expansive nature of the harm
under a structural perspective frees the state to intervene in unin-
tuitive ways. For example, to remedy subordination in one
institution (employment), the antisubordination principle may
require intervention in another, seemingly unrelated institution
(elementary education). This intervention too is constrained,
however, not by the extent of the victims' harm but by the legiti-
mate interests affected by the intervention. The antisubordination
principle will require sacrifices, but the sacrifices must be reason-
able. Under the antisubordination principle, for example,
employers will not be able to hire the best qualified candidate. But
that intervention must be tempered by the legitimate interests em-
ployers have in maintaining their businesses.
A. The Theory of Harm
Advocates of the antisubordination principle often describe it as
a principle against caste, but the metaphor of caste and its rela-
tionship to the antisubordination principle requires clarification.
As a descriptive metaphor, "caste" does not illuminate because of
the difficulty in viewing the current treatment of subordinated
groups as a caste system. Unlike traditional caste structures, one's
group assignment does not formally determine one's place within a
rigid, publicly recognized social hierarchy, nor does this assign-
ment imply other clearly defined rules of association. All persons
can, in theory, occupy any position in society. Furthermore, per-
sons are not limited, either in personal or intimate relationships,
from interacting with members of other groups. Though histori-
cally a true caste structure may have existed for blacks during the
25. E.g., Paul R. Dimond, The Anti-Caste Prnciple--Toward a Constitutional Standard for
Review of Race Cases, 30 WAYNE L. RaV. 1, 3 (1983) ("[E]ach person has the right to be free
from the continuing effects of caste discrimination in the laws, programs, official decisions, gov-
ernment, and community affairs of these United States." (emphasis added)); Fiss, supra note
8, at 151 ("The redistributive strategy could give expression to an ethical view against caste,
one that would make it undesirable for any social group to occupy a position of subordina-
tion for any extended period of time."); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2411 (providing an
account of "the anticaste principle"). There is also justice Harlan's famous statement that, in
the United States, "[there is no caste here." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan,J., dissenting).
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Jim Crow era, this is not, at least formally, the case today for any
group in U.S. society.
The use of "caste," however, is appropriate as a normative meta-
phor because it captures the general view that membership in a
group should not be the basis for one's place in society. In particu-
lar, the metaphor's emphasis on one's group membership and its
impact on one's place in society reflects both (1) the special claim
of the persons protected by the antisubordination principle and
(2) a conception of the societal treatment that the antisubordina-
tion principle targets. Rather than express, as a descriptive matter,
the current state of our social structure, the caste metaphor high-
lights a certain way of treating persons in society that is antithetical
to the commitment to equality reflected in the antisubordination
* principle.
This Section provides an account of the caste-like treatment that
the antisubordination principle targets. The first half of the Sec-
tion will be devoted to the normative significance of this
treatment-why we call such treatment subordinating. The second
half of the Section will be devoted to developing a concept, the
idea of a social position, necessary to fully understanding the socie-
tal treatment that is the focus of the antisubordination principle.
1. The Claim of Subordination
As I noted above, the metaphor of caste reflects the special
status of the classes protected by the antisubordination principle,
understood as the special claim persons in those classes can ex-
press about their treatment in society. The claim can be expressed
generally as the claim that one's treatment should not be based on
criteria that is (1) ascribed, (2) unreasonably burdensome to exit
or avoid, and (3) irrelevant, from a moral point of view, to one's
place in society. Taken together, these aspects of the claim-
ascription, the burdens of exit, and irrelevance--express the na-
ture of subordination. It expresses the cruel position of persons
who are subordinated and why the antisubordination principle
recognizes their special status.
Whether a class of persons is protected by the antisubordination
principle, therefore, will depend on whether persons in that class
can make that special claim of subordination. Understanding the
classes protected in this way frees the antisubordination principle to
consider the treatment of groups in society that, for whatever rea-
son, have not been protected by the Equal Protection Clause. It also
explains more compellingly why these groups deserve special pro-
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tection. It looks past the features common to these groups, such as,
in most cases, immutable characteristics and a history of discrimina-
tion, and instead focuses on the reasons that underlie their claim for
equality and why those reasons should be recognized.
a. Ascription
Ascription is understood by the antisubordination principle as
(1) the societal assignment of persons to a class or group position
with (2) that assignment being determinative of one's prospects in
society. Like in traditional caste structures, whatever class a person
is ascribed to will be important to his or her societal treatment.
Ascription mirrors closely a concern with status hierarchies, un-
derstood as the development of social structures that impact persons
differently on the basis of their class membership.26 It is important to
note, however, that the antisubordination principle only looks at
ascription in a narrow, causal sense. The antisubordination principle
looks solely at how social structures assign persons to certain groups
and the impact of that assignment. In order to state a claim of sub-
ordination, it is sufficient to say that group imposition and its
consequences are caused from outside of the group, from the ways
in which society is structured. Ascription, in this way, parallels tradi-
tional caste structures in that it takes structures of status hierarchy as
given. It treats ascription as a natural phenomenon.
It is also important to note that ascription is not limited in any
way to the nature of the traits or characteristics that define a disfa-
vored social class. Ascription can apply equally to both natural
traits, such as race and sex, and performative traits, such as sexual
orientation and religious practice. What matters from the perspec-
tive of the antisubordination principle is the significance given
these traits-to what extent the social position defined by the trait
disadvantages one's status in society. As Jack Balkin notes, "[t] here
is no necessary limitation on what characteristics can serve to dis-
tinguish status groups in a status hierarchy. They can be mutable or
immutable, physical or ideological, matters of behavior or matters
of appearance.,21
26, Jack Balkin, for example, provides a general theory of status competition to de-
scribe the subordination of groups in society. See generally Balkin, supra note 11. Reva Siegel
also expresses a concern with status hierarchies, in particular how status hierarchies endure
even in the face of changes injustificatory rhetoric. SeeReva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2178-87 (1996).
27. Balkin, supra note 11, at 2323. Balkin's view is similar to the causal interpretation of
ascription offered here. He notes that "[t]he question is... whether society has organized itself
into a system of super- and subordination based on ... traits." Id. In his later discussion on
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The use of the term "ascription," rather than "status hierar-
chies," is more appropriate because the term "ascription"
emphasizes the process of assigning persons into group positions.
This process has a normative importance under the antisubordina-
tion principle because of its fundamentally agent-independent
nature. When persons are ascribed into groups, they are at the
whim of social forces that are beyond their control. What sex, what
race, or what stigmatic group persons occupy will depend largely
on the prevailing social structure. Ascription expresses this sense of
both imputation and imposition of unfair burdens onto persons in
society-how such group assignments, and their subordinating ef-
fects, are ascribed to them. Ascription, therefore, better captures a
special claim about the responsibility, or lack of responsibility, of
persons for their group position in society.
Finally, the agent-independent nature of ascription shows that,
from the perspective of the antisubordination principle, it will not
matter whether the persons self-identify themselves with their as-
cribed status. I do not agree, as Owen Fiss has argued, that,
[T]he identity and existence of the group as a discrete entity
is in part determined by whether individuals identify them-
selves by membership in the group. If enough individuals
cease to identify themselves in terms of their membership in a
particular group (as occurs in the process of assimilation),
then the very identity and separate existence of the group-as
a distinct identity-will come to an end .
Even if members of the group choose not to define themselves
based on their ascribed status, they may still be subordinated inso-
far as society disadvantages them for their membership. If blacks
are subordinated, the Black Panther and the black non-militant
corporate attorney 9 will be equally subordinated . In fact, the
status competition, however, he places super- and subordination within a larger sociological
account of group conflict. See, e.g., id. at 2328-29. Ascription, as described here, is solely con-
cerned with the resultant subordination.
28. Fiss, supra note 8, at 149.
29. See, e.g., Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 E3d 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1997). For a
narrative account of Mungin's life and his de-emphasis, and later embrace, of his black heri-
tage and identity, see PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN
AMERICA (1999). An older example is Plessy v. Ferguson, where the plaintiff, Homer Piessy,
initially challenged a separate-but-equal railroad car provision by claiming that he was, in
fact, white, given that he was "seventh-eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African blood." 163
U.S. at 538. In these two instances, where persons explicitly disavow their ascriptive identity,
we would not, nor should not, deny them the protection of the Equal Protection Clause,
because, despite their disavowal, they are still being subordinated.
30. Iris Young makes a similar point: "[wihen a person complains of being the victim
of arbitrary search because he is Black, we do not need to know very much about how this
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process of assimilation represents an instance in which society
(outside of the group itself) no longer sees the group as distinct,
rather than, as Fiss argues, an instance in which the group no
longer self-identifies itself as a group. Assimilation always moves
towards some external standard.
b. Exit Constraints
The antisubordination principle also limits its scope to groups
defined by class assignments that are unreasonably difficult to exit
or avoid. Though ascription may attach to a wide variety of traits
and actions, the antisubordination principle focuses solely on as-
cription that can only be avoided or mitigated at great cost.
The concern with exit constraints mirrors the prohibitive (if not
permanent) nature of caste assignment in traditional caste struc-
tures, as well as current doctrine's concern with immutability.3' As
noted by Justice Brennan in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, our concern for burdens placed on persons on the basis of
race stems, in part, from the fact that "race, like -gender and ille-
gitimacy, is an immutable characteristic which its possessors are
powerless to escape or set aside.
32
Caste and immutability, however, overstate the degree to which
class assignment must be difficult to exit under the antisubordina-
tion principle. Unlike traditional caste assignments and immutable
characteristics, the antisubordination principle protects classes that
have the possibility of exit. The antisubordination principle, for
example, protects classes defined by sex although sex changes are
possible. What matters is not the presence or absence of these pos-
sibilities, but their burdensome nature. The antisubordination
principle focuses on the persistence of subordination, not necessarily
33
its permanence.
person defines his Black identity, or whether he does so at all." Iris Marion Young, Status
Inequality and Social Groups, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002, art. 9, at 6-7, http://
www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art9/.
31. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477
U.S. 635, 638 (1986)) (refusing to subject statutory classifications under the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children Act since, among other things, these classifications "do not ex-
hibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics."). For a more comprehensive
discussion of the law's insistence on immutability as a predicate for heightened scrutiny, see
Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell", 108 YALE L.J. 485, 493-96 (1998).
32. 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
33. See Balkin, supra note 11, at 2324 ("Obviously a system of subordination cannot be
too stable if it is too easy to exit from the criteria of subordinate status."); see also Fiss, supra
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At the same time, the antisubordination principle understands
the burdens of exit more broadly than physical impossibility or dif-
ficulty, since the durability of a group assignment can operate in
society in nuanced and sophisticated ways. Consider, for example,
the plaintiff in Dillon v. Frank, a post office employee named Ernest
Dillon who was "taunted, ostracized, and physically beaten by his
co-workers because of their belief that he was a homosexual."34 Dil-
lon himself was not homosexual, but because he was not
sufficiently "macho"35 co-workers consistently questioned his sexual
orientation and harassed him vehemently for it.
Despite not being homosexual at all, Dillon found it nearly im-
possible to avoid his homosexual designation, since his assignment
as a "fag" took on a life of its own despite numerous complaints.
His homosexual status, though not physical or biological in nature,
nevertheless had a durability that, once ascribed, was difficult if not
impossible for Dillon to shake. 7
Dillon v. Frank demonstrates that the difficulty of leaving one's
group position can also have a social as well as physical dimension.
Dillon could not shake his homosexual status because of the social
rigidity of his status rather than the rigidity of any physical aspect
of his person. Once he was labeled a homosexual, it stuck, and
there was little, if anything, he could do to get rid of it. This social
"stickiness" also applies to other sex-based classifications. The ini-
tial assignment of persons to a certain sexual orientation (as in the
note 8, at 150 (emphasizing, in elaborating on the group-disadvantaging principle, on "the
relative position of the group and the duration of the position" (emphasis added)).
34. No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
35. Id. at *4.
36. Id. at *1 ("Dillon complained to eight different supervisors, and two union repre-
sentatives. Management allegedly did nothing more than admonish the harassers, and hold
meetings detailing the policy against sexual harassment in place at the center. Dillon alleges
that management finally threw up their hands in despair, telling Dillon not to waste their
time with his complaints and to fight back when taunted.").
37. Consider, for example, Foucault's description of the birth of the homosexual:
The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a
childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an
indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his
total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at
the root of all of his actions because it was their insidious and indefinitely active prin-
ciple; written immodestly on his face and body because it was a secret that always gave
itself away ... The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was
now a species.
1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 43 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
paperback ed. 1991). In this passage Foucault not only describes the ascription of homo-
sexuals by nineteenth-century sexual discourse but also the permanence of this ascription,
how once ascribed, a person's homosexual status "was everywhere present in him." Id.
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Dillon case) or a certain gender can forever structure that person's
social position, despite the person's best efforts to change that po-
sition.
Again, impossibility, even sociological impossibility, is not re-
quired under the antisubordination principle. Even if a person
could "pass" sociologically as heterosexual, for example, such an
act of passing can entail great costs. It can greatly restrict who one
can associate with, frustrate and severely limit one's sexual activity,
and can involve, fundamentally, a denial of one's own self that is
both publicly and privately humiliating. As noted by Kenji Yoshino,
even the process of muting identity-salient characteristics (what he
calls "covering") in some instances "can also be a severe burden,
not least because it can sometimes blur into passing., 38 In one ex-
ample, he shows the effects of a lesbian mother's efforts to mute
her orientation upon moving to a new neighborhood, out of fear
of a backlash against her children (a backlash the family had ex-
perienced in the past):
The actions she takes to mute her orientation are not at-
tempts to recant her lesbianism, but rather attempts to
dislodge it from the center of attention. At the same time, by
keeping her lesbian posters in her bedroom, by being "dis-
creet" in the neighborhood, and by preserving a "low profile,"
[she] is explicitly making a compromise about her identity.39
Yoshino also describes how a failure to cover one's homosexuality
can also result in, for example, the loss of child custody rights and
civil service positions.4 0 These barriers to exiting one's homosexual
identity can be just as constraining, and thus just as subordinating,
as barriers that are impossible to overcome.
It is also important to emphasize the generally unreasonable, along
with the persistent, nature of the exit constraints recognized by the
antisubordination principle. The antisubordination principle only
focuses on exit constraints that are objectively compelling. These
constraints have an appeal that is not idiosyncratic to the persons
who currently inhabit the particular group position at issue.
Suppose, for example, following Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc.,
that an employment policy prohibits a certain hairstyle so that it
38. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 837 (2002). See generally KENJI YOSHINO,
COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006).
39. Yoshino, supra note 38, at 838.
40. Id. at 849-75.
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disproportionately affects one racial group over others." The pol-
icy will have a detrimental impact on the status of the individuals in
the disfavored racial group since it will restrict the overall employ-
ment prospects of those persons who insist on wearing the
prohibited hairstyle. Furthermore, there is a cost-changing one's
hairstyle-to exiting this detrimental position.
Whether the group can be considered subordinated will turn on
the nature of this cost. For example, to insist that the burden is un-
reasonable because of the importance of hair as a site of personal
expression may be too much to ask. Though hair and its symbolic
power can be incredibly important to one's sense of self, 2 insisting
on a right to express oneself borders on indulgent, especially in
the workplace.
This sense of indulgence makes it unlikely that the antisubordi-
nation principle would prohibit such a hairstyle policy. 43 It may
frustrate a person's personal interests, but not all frustrations of
personal interests are subordinating. One is not subordinated sim-
ply because one has to wear a suit to work.
Moreover, to insist on a right to wear one's hair a certain way
fails to account for the reasons the employer may have for prohib-
iting the hairstyle. These reasons, such as avoiding injury in the
workplace, may in fact be very compelling. Though an employer's
demands can be unreasonable, whether this is in fact the case de-
pends on an adjudication of the reasons for and against the
demand.
If, however, the reasons for objecting to the burden stem from
reasons that persons would find objectively compelling, such as a
medical condition that prevents compliance with the practice,44
then the analysis changes. Under these circumstances, rather than
adjudicate the employee's claim against the employer's claim, our
intuition is to require the employer to sacrifice his or her claims.
This does not mean that the employer's claims are unimportant,
41. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Rogers arose in the context of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, which regulates private employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
42. For example, Paulette Caldwell, who first brought attention to Rogers, provides one
moving account of her own relationship to her hair in Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece:
Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365, 365-66.
43. One way in which the hairstyle policy may be prohibited under the antisubordina-
tion principle is that it may foster a bias against members of the racial group that can have
subordinating consequences. Here I assume that no such bias results from the policy.
44. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993) (prohibiting a
"no beard" employment policy because of its disparate impact on black males, since ap-
proximately fifty percent of black males suffer from pseudofolliculitis barbae ("PFB"), a
condition that prevents half of those afflicted from shaving); Richardson v. Quik Trip Corp.,
591 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (same); EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54 (D.
Colo. 1981) (same).
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but rather that they have a diminished status compared to the claim
of the persons affected, since at stake is the livelihood of the indi-
vidual and the pain or impossibility of gaining the means to secure
that livelihood.
The diminished status of the employer's claim may be difficult
to see in the context of grooming, but consider statutes like the
Americans with Disabilities Act that require employers to "accom-
modate" persons with disabilities.4 In this context, sacrifices are
imposed upon employers to reasonably accommodate such per-
sons, and these sacrifices can entail, to borrow a phrase from
ChristineJolls, "real financial costs.
4
6
It is important to clarify how the two examples above are analyti-
cally distinct. In the "personal expression" example, the employee
and employer claims are adjudicated as competing claims. It pre-
sumes the underlying equality of the nature of the claims
presented. One may be more compelling than the other, but they
are qualitatively the same kind of personal claim. In contrast, in
the disability example, the disability claim has a qualitative priority
over the employer claim. The nature of the disability claim lessens
the employer's claim.
In the disability example, the employer's claim is diminished be-
cause, unlike in the "personal expression" example, the employer
also has a reason to help persons disadvantaged by objectively
compelling burdens like disabilities, a reason that, in turn, lessens
his or her own claim. In other Words, an employer has no reason
45. Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), for example, prohibits em-
ployers from "discriminat[ing]" against persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(2000). It defines discrimination as, among other things, the failure to make "reasonable
accommodations" for persons with disabilities, unless such accommodations would place an
"undue hardship" on the employer. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
46. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 686
(2001). The "disparate impact" test initially found in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971), and later codified in Congress's 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, also
expresses a policy of imposing sacrifices upon employees. If an employment policy dispro-
portionately impacts a group, defined by an immutable characteristic (as outlined
statutorily), then the policy must be prohibited unless there is a "business necessity" that
justifies it, with "business necessity" defined narrowly as a necessity required for the business
to function. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000). AsJolls points out, the test essentially
functions as an "accommodation" test, requiring the employer to incur "real financial costs"
in hiring the persons affected, including the loss of customers and lower levels of productiv-
ity.jolls, supra, at 686-87.
47. One way to describe the distinction between the two examples is by reference to
Thomas Nagel's distinction between agent-relative reasons, that is, reasons relative to a par-
ticular agent, and agent-neutral reasons, or reasons that apply to everyone. See THOMAS
NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 152-53 (1986). The "personal expression" example in-
volves solely agent-relative reasons-the reasons an employee may have for having cornrows
are relative to the employee, and the reasons the employer may have for insisting on an-
other hairstyle are relative to the employer. The disability example, however, triggers an
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to promote his or her employee's personal interests over his or her
own, but does have a reason to accommodate an employee's inter-
ests when to do otherwise would effectively mean that the
employee would not have ajob."
This distinction is reflected in the law. Under Title VII, for ex-
ample, if an employment practice has a "disparate impact" on
persons on the basis of race (that is, it burdens persons on the ba-
sis of their particular race), then the employment practice is
invalid unless the employer can point to a "business necessity" for
the practice.49 In other words, Title VII prohibits the employment
practice no matter how rational and innocent, absent extraordinary
justification, which amounts to an accommodation of the interests
of the burdened class.
To sum up, the antisubordination principle does not require
strict immutability. It can also recognize subordination caused by
barriers that are (1) persistent and (2) generally unreasonable to
overcome.
c. Irrelevance
Finally, the classes protected by the antisubordination principle
are defined by criteria that are irrelevant from a moral point of view.
It is important to note, however, that the antisubordination princi-
ple defines irrelevancy, like ascription, in a very specific way.
agent-neutral reason to accommodate the disabled employee that applies equally to the
employer and, in turn, diminishes whatever agent-relative reasons he or she have in not
accommodating the employee.
48. I thus disagree with Kenji Yoshino when he states in the context of "double bind,"
or contradictory demands, that what is "'intolerable' in these cases is not that the demands
are contradictory, but rather that either demand is made at all." Yoshino, supra note 38, at
918-19 (discussing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 235, 251 (1989)); see also Yoshino,
supra note 38, at 158. In the context of Rogers, Yoshino states the central issue this way:
In reading the Rogers case, one can hear American Airlines and the court asking
Rogers: "Why is this so important to you?" To which Rogers would respond: "Why is
this so important to you?"
YOSHINO, supra note 38, at 133. I do not disagree with Yoshino's attempt to question the
demands placed on persons by employers. But, as noted above, some of these demands may
be compelling, and the employee's demands should not have any greater presumptive
weight. More importantly, employers may have reason to accommodate employee demands
regardless of how compelling the employer's demands are if to do otherwise puts employees
in the position of either meeting the employer demand at a debilitating cost or not having a
job. Thus, in the Rogers example it is unclear to me whether a ban on cornrows would offend
the antisubordination principle. Is it too much to ask to wear a different hairstyle?
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1)(A)(i) (2000).
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Irrelevancy, for example, can mean that no rational basis exists
for the use of the criteria in a given context. Under this contextual
view, the government may not, for example, target persons of a
certain race for suspected criminal activity if there is no basis for
targeting that race. Persons of other races may commit crimes in
equal measure. If, however, a strong correlation exists between
criminal activity and a specific race, then a person's race would be-
come relevant because race would be strongly indicative of
criminal activity."0 Under this contextual view, racial profiling is
permissible insofar as evidence suggests that the use of race in this
way is a rational law enforcement tool.
The antisubordination principle rejects this contextual view of
moral irrelevancy. Even if the use of a group assignment like race is
rational, the antisubordination principle would still prohibit its use
if it is detrimental to one's social standing in society. This view mir-
rors our own reasons for rejecting traditional caste structures, since
what animates our disdain is not the fact that caste is not rationally
related to societal ends in certain contexts. Caste may be, and likely
is, indicative of one's criminality, for example. Instead, our rejec-
tion of caste stems from a belief that one's caste assignment should
not be the basis for one's overall place in society. Group assign-
ment, in other words, should not determine one's prospects and
personal welfare in society, even if it is otherwise rational in some,
or even most, contexts:
That is why the antisubordination principle rejects racial profil-
ing. While racial profiling would arguably lead to increased
security, it would also lead to a societal bias against persons of
50. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAw 137 (1997) ("Obtaining infor-
mation is expensive, so we depend upon various sorts of proxies, such as educational
credentials, to lessen the costs entailed in gathering the information we need to make sensi-
ble decisions.... [W]e look to proxies to help us calculate at less expense the risk that a
given individual is likely to [act criminally]-proxies such as gender, age, clothing, posture,
accent, and, yes, race."). Others have argued in favor of racial profiling precisely for this
reason. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Context is Everything with Racial Profiling, L.A. TiMES,,Jan. 27,
2002, at M6; Mathias Risse & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Racial Profiling (Kennedy Sch. of Gov't,
Working Paper No. RWPO3-201, 2003).
51. To see the distinction between contextual relevance and what can be called "life
prospects" relevance, consider a sports example. Suppose that the Boston Red Sox want to
add a starting pitcher to their roster. The Red Sox will evaluate the available candidates
based on a number of metrics, such as age, past performance, and number of innings
pitched, that will predict future pitching performance. Within the context of looking for a
major league starting pitcher, it is rational to look at metrics that predict the best future
pitching performance. But future pitching performance is not relevant to the minimum life
prospects the pitching candidates should have. One should not have to pitch like Josh
Beckett in order to have decent housing or an effective fight to vote. Similarly, race may be
relevant in given contexts such as racial profiling, but race is not relevant to what kind of life
prospects a person should have.
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statistically more criminal races than persons of other races. It
would lead to members in the criminalized group, regardless of
who they are or their criminal history, being treated with less re-
spect than members of other groups. In other words, the
antisubordination principle would reject racial profiling because in
operation it would create a subclass of persons in society that are
not afforded the dignity its members, as persons, deserve.52
The antisubordination principle takes a broader view of irrele-
vancy. It looks beyond different contexts to examine the role group
assignment plays in a person's life. More specifically, the antisub-
ordination principle looks at whether one's group assignment
determines objectively important aspects of any person's life. These
important aspects can include the attainment of what John Rawls
has called "primary goods," such as income, primary education,
and political liberties, which are important and necessary means to
achieving other specific ends. Objectively important aspects of a
person's life can also include, as suggested by the racial profiling
example above, what Owen Fiss has called "status harms"-how
members of the group are respected by others in society because of
their group assignment.54 Status harms are objectively important
because they can detrimentally affect how persons view themselves
52. My rejection of racial profiling on the basis of its subordinating effects does not
depend on any specific conception of what actions or decisions constitute racial profiling.
More specifically, I would even reject the use of race in suspect descriptions, where the use
of race is more particularized and, for the most part, constitutionally permissible, if such a
use of race resulted in the kind of criminality bias I describe above. Cf R. Richard Banks,
Racial Profiling and Antiterrorism Efforts, 89 COPNELL I,. REv. 1201 (2004) (distinguishing
between "racial profiling" and the use of race in suspect descriptions, though arguing that
this distinction should not matter in evaluating the consequences of these practices).
53. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 58 (2001) [hereinafter RAWLS,
FAIRNESS] (defining "primary goods" as goods persons "need as free and equal persons living
a complete life; they are not things it is simply rational to want or desire, or to prefer or even
to crave" (emphasis added)). The focus on primary goods reflects a particular conception of
the good that just institutions should achieve-the good of trying to fulfill, as much as prac-
ticable, a man's rational life plans. As Rawls notes, against utilitarianism's focus on utility,
"[t]he main idea is that a person's good is determined by what is for him the most rational
long-term plan of life given reasonably favorable circumstances." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE § 15, at 79 (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter RAWtS, THEORY]; see also id. § 60, at 347-55
(listing such goods).
54. See Fiss, supra note 8, at 157. This parallels Rawls's own concern with "self-respect"
as a primary good. See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 53, § 67, at 386-91. I also take the con-
cern with such "status-harms" to be the significance of the psychological evidence presented
in Brown. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 nIll (1954); see also id. at 494 ("To sepa-
rate [black schoolchildren] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may af-
fect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."). Here the plaintiffs were
not only invoking the material and political interests of a quality education, but also the
stigmatic harm and the feeling of inferiority that comes with segregated schools. Id.
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in relation to others in society, a harm in itself, and also limit the
possibilities persons can envision for themselves.
Together, the antisubordination principle's concern with the ef-
fect of group assignment on both objectively important material
and status aspects of a person's life expresses a concern with a per-
son's overall place in society. These aspects represent the basis for
determining whether group assignment is truly subordinating,
since they determine what a person can meaningfully aspire to. It is
this sense of foreclosed possibilities that the antisubordination
principle targets. The antisubordination principle holds strongly
that no group assignment should be the basis for setting a ceiling
on one's prospects in society.
At the same time, the antisubordination principle allows for
non-subordinating inequality, for two reasons. First, the antisubor-
dination principle permits the differential treatment of persons
because of their group membership if the group membership in
question is directly related to the overall prospects of other persons
in society. Persons of great intelligence, or who have important
natural skills, are justifiably treated differently in society because
encouraging persons in these groups to exercise their talents leads
to the improvement of everyone's prospects in society. Rawls, for
example, has argued that persons with these talents may need rea-
sonable signaling incentives to exercise their talents in ways to
make everyone better off.
55
The sense of reciprocity suggested by Rawls, where preferential
treatment must advantage those who are not the recipients of that
treatment, is not required. This leads to the second reason for al-
lowing non-subordinating inequality. Even if differences in
treatment do not have wealth-enhancing effects, it is important to
recognize that personal and societal interests in society are plural
We care about other things, and as long as these interests are con-
sistent with the antisubordination principle, there is no reason why
we should sacrifice them.56 Some prefer more wealth (or watching
55. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 53, § 48, at 277 ("The function of unequal distributive
shares is to cover the costs of training and education, to attract individuals to places and
associations where they are most needed from a social point of view, and so on.").
56. A similar point is made by Cass Sunstein:
The point is not that human equality should be "traded off" against the seemingly
sterile and abstract notion of market efficiency. I do not claim that otherwise unjusti-
fied inequality can be supported by some intrinsic good called "efficiency" Efficiency
is an instrumental good, though no less important for that. I argue only that intru-
sions on markets may defeat valuable human goals and that this is important to keep
in mind.
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basketball), some do not, and the antisubordination principle has
sufficient room to allow us to act on a variety of interests.
In other words, the antisubordination principle is only con-
cerned with obtaining an objective baseline of material and
dignitary goods. In the case of dignitary goods, as suggested by the
racial profiling example, the baseline is steep: No group can have a
pariah status in society. In the case of material goods, however,
relative inequality can be high as long as a modicum of goods (like
an adequate primary education, adequate housing, the free right
to vote, etc.) is guaranteed. The antisubordination principle binds
us, but it does not enslave us.
2. The Concept of a Social Position
a. Social Position Defined
The account of subordination above depends on an important
concept worth clarifying-the concept of a social position.
Throughout this Article I have used the terms "class" and
"group" to describe the antisubordination principle's subject of
concern. Terms such as "group" and "class" have been used since
the very first formulations of the antisubordination principle, 57 and
they are used today.5
Their use, however, is somewhat inappropriate, because terms
such as "class" and "group" suggest that the difference between the
antisubordination principle and the antidiscrimination principle is
one of aggregation. One looks at an aggregation of similarly situated
persons (literally "groups") while the other looks at individuals.
While some have meant to suggest a group-based approach, 59 and
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2437-38.
57. E.g., Fiss, supra note 8, at 147-56.
58. E.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 11, at 465-67 (moving from suspect classifications to
"suspect classes").
59. See Fiss, supra note 8, at 147-56; see also TRIBE, supra note 11, § 16-21, at 1514-21
("[Sitrict judicial scrutiny would be reserved for those government acts that, given their
history, context, source, and effect, seem most likely not only to perpetuate subordination
but also to reflect a tradition of hostility toward an historically subjugated group, or a pat-
tern of blindness or indifference to the interests of that group."); Balkin, supra note 11, at
2315-16 (focusing on "group conflict"); Colker, supra note 11, at 1008 ("In contrast to the
anti-differentiation approach, the anti-subordination perspective is a group-based perspec-
tive." (emphasis added)); Siegel, supra note 8, at 1472-73 (discussing historical rejection of
antisubordination principle because of its group focus, defining the principle as "the convic-
tion that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status
of historically oppressed groups"); Young, supra note 30, at 4 ("A concept of status inequality
entails a concept of social group." (emphasis added)).
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others have criticized it, ° the antisubordination principle takes a
different approach.
The subject of the antisubordination principle is not groups but
social positions. References to "groups" or "classes" in this Article are
only attempts to capture the idea that:
* within society there are positions that are inhabited
by individuals,
* that these positions are defined by society's struc-
ture, and
* that these positions can impact the lives of the indi-
viduals who inhabit them..
In other words, the true focus of the antisubordination principle
is not on groups but on group membership-on what it means to be
classified a certain way in society.
Group membership can be properly cognized as a position be-
cause of the way that it fixes one's place in society. This is most
transparent in caste societies, where one's membership in a caste
formally defines one's place within a social hierarchy. But this is
also true of other forms of group membership. For example,
church affiliation, family affiliation, and where one went to college
all determine one's social status in society in one way or another.6'
The use of the term "social position," rather than "group mem-
bership" or "group affiliation," however, is more appropriate
because it shifts the focus away from the group itself to its effects
60. The biggest critic of a group-based approach is undoubtedly the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("At the
heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the principle that the gov-
ernment must treat citizens as individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious
groups. It is for this reason that we must subject all racial classifications to the strictest of
scrutiny."); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995) (basing the deci-
sion on "the basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments [to the
Constitution] protect persons, not groups").
61. This idea of social positions is not new, and has been used in social science litera-
ture. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 94 (2000) ("A social
structure can be defined as a multidimensional space of differentiated social positions among
which a population is distributed." (emphasis added) (quoting PETER BLAU, INEQUALITY
AND HETEROGENEITY 4 (1977))). The idea of a social position is also suggested by John
Rawls's concept of a "representative man." RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 53, § 16, at 81. One
key difference, however, is that Rawls conceives of the "representative man" in very general
terms as "the representative citizen and the representatives of those with different expecta-
tions for the unequally distributed primary goods." Id. at 82. Rawls, in fact, distinguishes the
position of the "representative citizen" from other positions based on "fixed natural charac-
teristics," such as sex, race, and culture, which may be relevant positions to the basic
structure insofar as they are the cause of unequal rights. Id. at 84-85. My own view closely
resembles Rawls's concern with unequal positions based on "fixed natural characteristics,"
though, as I have argued above, see supra Section I (A)(1)(b), these positions need not be
founded on characteristics that are strictly fixed and natural.
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on its members. The antisubordination principle is solely con-
cerned with where group membership actually places a person in
society, not the group membership itself. In particular, the anti-
subordination principle is concerned with social positions that
subordinate--those social positions that are imposed on persons
(ascription), that are difficult to leave (exit constraints), and which
have an unjustifiably detrimental effect on that person's material
and dignitary well-being (irrelevance) .
This is less an issue of terminology than of focus. To emphasize
aggregation over social conditions obscures the structural perspec-
tive of the antisubordination principle. The antisubordination
principle has the potential to affect a lot of persons, but so does
the antidiscrimination principle. The antisubordination principle,
however, would care about subordinated positions that had only
one member, or even zero members, if there was a threat that any
63person would inhabit that position. Its concern is the structural
condition itself--the very fact that persons can, or could be, placed
in positions of subordination. For the antisubordination principle,
this concern with positions takes precedence over everything else.
b. Personal v. Representational
By focusing on group membership, the antisubordination prin-
ciple focuses on representational harm rather than personal harm.
The concern is less with how individuals themselves are, in fact,
detrimentally treated and more with the subordinating nature of
the social position itself.
For example, within any subordinated group there may be some
members who are less disadvantaged than others. There are, in
fact, both rich and poor women. Yet examples of well-off women
do not undermine the fact that women occupy a subordinated so-
62. It should be noted that Iris Young develops a concept of a "structural inequality"
that is similar to the subordinated social position I outline here. SeeYoung, supra note 30, at
2 ("Diverse social structures and practices conspire to locate some people in positions where
they repeatedly suffer disadvantage in access to benefits, or they are stigmatized in many
situations, or they are regarded as suspect or inferior by others who are more advantaged.").
Young, however, retains the concept of a group, arguing that "[a] concept of status inequal-
ity entails a concept of social group." Id. at 4 (emphasis added); see also YOUNG, supra note 61,
at 97 ("In summary, a structural social group is a collection of persons who are similarly posi-
tioned in interactive and institutional relations that condition their opportunities and life
prospects." (emphasis added)). Young retains the concept of a group as part of her larger
account of identity politics. SeeYOUNG, supra note 61, at 92-99. My concern here is how the
law should eradicate social positions regardless of the means, political or otherwise.
63. The concern with such "zero" member subordinated positions provides the basis
for the antisubordination principle's concern with welfare rights. See infra Conclusion.
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cial position in society, since a variety of other causes impact a per-
son's life. The different economic positions of women in society
may be due to factors such as one's own personal conduct, where
one grew up, etc.
Nevertheless, all women, both rich and poor, share the disadvan-
tage of being women in a largely patriarchal society." Justice
Rehnquist describes the long history (and continuance) of one
particular disadvantage, employment discrimination, in his discus-
sion of the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs-
The history of the many state laws limiting women's employ-
ment opportunities is chronicled in-and, until relatively
recently, was sanctioned by-this Court's own opinions. For
example, in Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873) (Illinois),
and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464, 466 (1948) (Michigan),
the Court upheld state laws prohibiting women from practic-
ing law and tending bar, respectively. State laws frequently
subjected women to distinctive restrictions, terms, conditions,
and benefits for those jobs they could take. In Muller v. Oregon,
208 U. S. 412, 419, n.1 (1908), for example, this Court
approved a state law limiting the hours that women could
work for wages, and observed that 19 States had such laws at
the time. Such laws were based on the related beliefs that (1)
woman is, and should remain, "the center of home and family
life," Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 62 (1961), and (2) "a proper
discharge of [a woman's] maternal functions-having in view
64. Owen Fiss makes the same point more concisely: "Even rich blacks are blacks."
Owen Fiss, Another Equality, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002, art. 20, at 22, http://
www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art20/. Chris Rock puts it more humorously:
Yeah, it's tough being a white person these days.
But not that tough. I am absolutely certain.
Why? Because there's not a white person reading this book who would change places
with me.
And I'm rich!
CHRIS ROCK, ROCK THIS! 31 (1997).
This suggests an independence between one's socio-economic status and, in this case, ra-
cial status. The independence between one's socio-economic status and racial status may
suggest independent ways of addressing both problems. In other words, it is unclear whether
so-called "socio-economic" affirmative action would alleviate subordination based on race or
gender. Others disagree. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY:
ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, AND TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002) (arguing that
race distracts from the socio-economic roots of current subordination); Richard Sander,
Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472 (1997) (arguing in
favor of socio-economic affirmative action).
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not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race-
justif[ies] legislation to protect her from the greed as well as
the passion of man," Muller, supra, at 422. Until our decision
in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), "it remained the prevail-
ing doctrine that government, both federal and state, could
withhold from women opportunities accorded men so long as
any 'basis in reason"'-such as the above beliefs-"could be
conceived for the discrimination." [United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)] (quoting Goesaert, supra, at 467).
[However] "[I]t can hardly be doubted that ... women still
face pervasive, although at times more subde, discrimination
... in the job market." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677,
686 (1973).65
Justice Rehnquist's description of the employment barriers im-
posed against women brings to mind Justice Brennan's famous
statement in Frontiero v. Richardson, that "[t]raditionally, such dis-
crimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic
paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedes-
tal, but in a cage."66 That cage applied, and still applies, to all women
regardless of their economic position. In fact, Justice Brennan's
use of the term "cage" invokes the concept of a subordinated social
position-that is, for whatever "romantic" reasons, the status of be-
ing a woman has trapped women into lesser employment
opportunities.
The above example shows the need to understand what a subor-
dinated social position means on the whole apart from the specific
experiences of members in the group. Focusing on the details of
the lives of individual women, rich, poor, old, young, etc., only con-
fuses the issue, because it obscures their common position. The
concern instead should be with attaining a sense of what it means
to be an inhabitant of this position-of how any person would be
affected if one were a woman."
65. 538 U.S. 721, 729-30 (2003).
66. 411 U.S. 677,684 (1973) (emphasis added).
67. Storytelling may be important as a means to understand subordinating conditions.
If used correctly, it can shed light on what it is like to inhabit subordinated positions. I take
this to be the central insight of the emphasis on "storytelling" in critical race theory. E.g.,
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv.
2411, 2413 (1988) (arguing for "counterstorytelling" by stating that "[s]tories, parables,
chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for destroying mindset-the bundle of pre-
suppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of which
legal and political discourse takes place.").
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The antisubordination principle captures the structural sense of
a social position by focusing on the extent to which harms inflicted
on the group are caused by the social position, regardless of the in-
habitant. The antisubordination principle does not view a
collection of similar individuals differentially impacted as a subor-
dinated position unless there is something about the position itself
that makes it a disadvantaged position in society.
Finding out whether a social position disadvantages persons in
society will involve (1) an analysis of whether the position is unde-
sirable from a status point of view as well as (2) an analysis of
whether occupants of the position would be treated differently be-
cause of their position from a material point of view. The concepts
of status harm and material harm are so intertwined with each
other that it is difficult, if not futile, to consider one without the
other. Material harms may be more pronounced than stigmatic
harms. This is probably the case with illegal immigrants, whose le-
gal status and the material deprivation it entails is the source of
their subordination, though stigma does play a large role. But
status may trump materiality, as in the case of wealthy women. The
common factor that both of these positions share is the subordina-
tion (one mainly material, the other mainly stigmatic) caused by
the positions.
Moreover, the antisubordination principle does not focus on any
particular cause of how subordinating social positions came about.
Social positions can be legally constructed, as in the case of blacks
during the Jim Crow era68 and illegal immigrants today. Social posi-
tions also can be socially constructed, by how persons act within
the existing legal structure. 6 This is especially true of the subordi-
nation of women, which is relegated to personal spheres of life.7 °
Determining the subordinating nature of a social position will
require a number of analytical tools, such as statistics, social sci-
ence, and ethnography.7' I want to single out history as an
68. See, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, "Black" and "White" in Brown: Equal Protection and the Le-
gal Construction of Racial Identities, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002, art. 16, at 3,
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artl6/"("[T]here is no doubt that in many respects, race
in America has been notjust a social but a political and specifically legal construction.").
69. This is one of the great contributions of critical race theorists, though such theo-
rists tend to focus on the processes of social group formation, whereas, like Fiss, I take an
ahistorical approach, focusing solely on the resultant subordination. See Kathryn Abrams,
"Groups" and the Advent of Critical Race Scholarship, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002,
art. 10, at 4, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artlO/.
70. E.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN,JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 146 (1989) (arguing
that the subordination of women is grounded, in part, in the gender division of labor in the
family.).
71. In fact, I find much of the recent social science research on race to be an examina-
tion of the subordinated status of racial social positions-in particular, whether being black
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analytical tool, because it can serve an important evidentiary role.
History can help determine whether a given position is subordi-
nated by how the position has been cognized and treated by society
in the past. Justice Rehnquist's history of women in employment, as
quoted above, is one example, as he uses history as a guide to un-
derstanding the plight of women in employment today.
Though history can serve as a guide, one must also recognize
that new subordinated social positions can develop. The antisub-
ordination principle does not limit the class of subordinated
positions to those that have surfaced in the past. For example, the
antisubordination principle recognizes the subordinated status of
immigrant groups just entering into the United States even though
they have not been subordinated historically. 72 As Owen Fiss has
noted, if we are sure that a group of persons are about to be sub-
ordinated, our concern would be the same as for those groups that
have been historically subordinated.73
Other subordinated social positions can arise in other, more un-
intuitive ways. For example, blacks from urban ghettos inhabit a
new, hybrid subordinated social position. William Julius Wilson has
argued in his work on Chicago ghettos that the lack of employ-
ment opportunities for blacks has lead to a self-reinforcing cycle of
increased criminal activity, decreased development of job-related
skills, and even lower employment prospects. He writes that
"[b]lacks reside in neighborhoods and are engaged in social net-
works and households that are less conducive to employment than
those of other ethnic and racial groups in the inner city. In the
eyes of employers in metropolitan Chicago, these differences render
inner-city blacks less desirable workers, and therefore many are reluctant to
hire them .
'74
is a disadvantaged position in society. E.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimina-
tion in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1991) (discussing whether blacks are
disadvantaged in buying cars at car dealerships); Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, The
Causes and Consequences of Distinctively Black Names, Q.J. ECON., Aug. 2004, at 767 (discussing
whether distinctively black names hurt black people's employment chances); Christine Jolls
& Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REv. 969 (2006) (discussing whether
employers have an implicit bias against black employees); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Con-
tent of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1238-41 (1995) (same).
72. E.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981) (concerning the elementary education of
the children of illegal immigrants). For a larger discussion of Plyler, see infra Section
II(B) (2) (c).
73. See Fiss, supra note 8, at 151 n.67 ("[I]f we are told that today a period of perpetual
subordination is about to begin for another group, we should be as concerned with the
status of that group as we are with the blacks.").
74. WILLIAMJULIUs WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 111 (1996) (emphasis added).
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I understand this subordinated position as a new position be-
cause it does not affect all blacks-hence Wilson's focus on "inner-
city blacks." The primary source of subordination stems not from
the status of skin color (though that does play a part) ,75 but from
geography. Subordination is the result of living away from entry-
level jobs and quality schools, a by-product of the suburbanization
of America.6 This is one instance in which one's actual location
literally defines one's social position. The subordinating effect of
this geography has lead Owen Fiss to call urban ghettos "a struc-
ture of subordination, which, by isolating and concentrating the
most disadvantaged, creates the very dynamics that render the
quality of life of those forced to live in it so miserable and their
prospect of success so bleak."
7
Finally, the goal of the antisubordination principle is to eradi-
cate the subordinating meaning of a given social position, not the
social position itself.
As noted by Neil Gotanda, a social position can have multiple
meanings, both positive and negative. In his article A Critique of
"Our Constitution is Color-Blind", Gotanda argues that the concept of
"race" consists, in fact, of four different concepts: formal skin color
(formal-race), its historical meaning (historical-race), its subordi-
nating effects (status-race), and its positive contributions (culture-
race) . Gotanda makes these distinctions as a way of critiquing a
"color-blind" approach to race, since to focus only on formal-race
75. Wilson, in particular, could not find any comparable employment effect of ghettos
on other minority groups. "Although empirical studies on race and employer attitudes are
limited, the available research does suggest that African-Americans, more than any other major
racial or ethnic group, face negative employer perceptions about their qualifications and their
work ethic." Id. (emphasis added).
76. See id. at 37.
The increasing suburbanization of employment has accompanied industrial restruc-
turing and has further exacerbated the problems of inner-city joblessness and
restricted access to jobs....
... [O]ne result of these changes for many urban blacks has been a growing mis-
match between the suburban location of employment and minorities' residence in
the inner city. Although studies based on data collected before 1970 showed no con-
sistent or convincing effects on black employment as a consequence of this spatial
mismatch, the employment of inner-city blacks relative to suburban blacks has clearly deterio-
rated since then.
Id. (emphasis added).
77. Owen Fiss, What Should Be Done for Those Who Have Been Left Behind?, in A WAY OUT:
AMERICA's GHETTOS AND THE LEGACY OF RACISM 5 (Joshua Cohen,Jefferson Decker &Joel
Rogers eds., 2003).
78. Gotanda, supra note 11, at 3-5.
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(color blindness, or what Gotanda calls "nonrecognition")" ig-
nores the truly bad aspects of race, status- and historical-race,
which perpetuate racial subordination. s° The goal instead should
be to remedy status and historical race and promote the good as-
pects of race, namely culture-race.8 '
Gotanda's argument applies with equal force to all social posi-
tions. As with race, there are aspects of gender, disabilities, and
sexuality that are empowering and a source of great pride. The an-
tisubordination principle does not aim to disturb these aspects in
any way.
B. The Theory of State Obligation
This Section describes the antisubordination principle's theory
of state obligation. Currently, enforcement of the Equal Protection
Clause is predicated on the existence of state action. Under the
antisubordination principle, however, the existence of subordina-
tion can arise independently of any action, state or private. The
predicate of state action, therefore, is unnecessary for the antisub-
ordination principle, and the first subsection will explain why.
The second subsection will then describe the ways in which the
state can act to remedy subordination. Unlike the antidiscrimina-
tion principle, which limits the state to making the victim whole,
the state can take much more diverse action to eradicate subordi-
nation under the antisubordination principle. In particular, the
state can:
1. act prospectively, rather than retrospectively, to
eliminate subordination,
2. act continuously, without any definite deadline,
3. target other institutions that did not cause the un-
derlying subordination,
4. benefit others who are not harmed by subordina-
tion, and, most controversially,
79. Id. at 16.
80. Id. at 36-52 (arguing against a limited understanding of race that is "unconnected"
to its historical and status aspects, thereby perpetuating subordination).
81. Id. at 62-68 (arguing for ajurisprudential regime that fosters culture-race). Others
have argued that fostering culture-race may, in fact, conflict with eradicating the subordinat-
ing character of race. Richard Thompson Ford, for example, argues that segregation to
foster multiculturalism may exacerbate subordinating segregation. See Richard Thompson
Ford, Brown's Ghost, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1305, 1318-28 (2004).
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5. harm persons innocent of creating the underlying
subordination.
I will examine these aspects in more detail in the second subsec-
tion.
1. State Action and Social Disaster
a. State Action and Failure to Protect
The state action requirement is a creature of the transactional
perspective, in particular the perspective's theory of state obligation.
The theory is corrective: Actors are obligated to remedy their
wrongdoing. The antidiscrimination principle, however, further
narrows this theory by looking only at state wrongdoing. As noted
in the Civil Rights Cases, the very first articulation of the modern
state action requirement, "[i] ndividual invasion of individual rights
is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment,"
rather, the Fourteenth Amendment "nullifies and makes void all
state legislation, and state action of every kind, which ... denies to
any [person] the equal protection of the laws.
'2
Since the Equal Protection Clause only looks to state wrongdoing,
it follows that it only looks at state action. As Justice Rehnquist
writes in United States v. Morrison: "[T]he principle has become
firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action
as may fairly be said to be that of the States.",3 The state action doctrine
therefore serves a gatekeeping function, in that application of the
Equal Protection Clause will depend on identification of some ac-
tion of the state to scrutinize. Because of its gatekeeping role,
much of the commentary on the state action requirement has fo-
cused on what constitute actions by the state. 4
82. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (limiting Congress's Section 5 powers
to "correcting the effects of such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render them
effectually null, void, and innocuous" (emphasis added)).
83. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 13, n.12 (1948)) (emphasis added).
84. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 71-75 (1993); LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 246-66 (1985). It should be noted that I focus here on
a "wrongdoing" interpretation of state action. Judicial intervention must be predicated by
some finding of wrongdoing fairly attributable to the state. I do not discuss a broader, what
can be called an "involvement" interpretation of state action, which finds state action so
long as the state was somehow involved. Because the state is, or at least potentially, involved
in everything, state action under an involvement view is everywhere. See SUNSTEIN, supra, at
72 ("If the background involvement of state officials is sufficient to produce 'state action,'
the whole category would be impossibly broad."). An involvement view of state action, there-
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Whether state action exists, however, turns on the underlying
theory of wrongdoing. Wrongdoing can be defined as a prohibition,
as the refraining from performing an action. Under the antidis-
crimination principle, for example, wrongdoing is defined as
discrimination on the basis of classifications such as race or sex.
The state is prohibited from discriminating in this way.85 Wrongdo-
ing can also be defined, however, as a duty, as an affirmative
obligation to perform an action when certain conditions obtain.
The state can act in an otherwise permissible way and still commit
wrongdoing if that otherwise permissible action failed to conform
to the duty.
I emphasize this latter point to show one key flaw in current
state action doctrine: the Court's erroneous construction of the
state action requirement as excluding state inaction. The question
of whether the state action requirement cognizes inaction (or
omissions, to use a more precise term) as state action depends on
whether the Equal Protection Clause is conceived of as a prohibi-
tion or a duty. In this way, to borrow a phrase from Laurence Tribe,
the state action debate is, at bottom, "a subterfuge for substantive
choices the framers did not necessarily make one way or the
other."
8 6
It is true that, in isolation, an action does not arise from a failure
to act. A person does not do anything by not climbing Mount Ev-
erest. Since the Court always looks at the state action requirement
in isolation, as a predicate to further application of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, this may explain its hesitation to recognize
omissions as state action.87
The Court's hesitation, however, is unwarranted, because it fails
to recognize that omissions gain traction as actions once evaluated
against the background of a duty. In this way the failure to act be-
comes an action that can serve as a basis of culpability.
fore, renders incoherent any effort to define state action. Cf Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet,
State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEo. L.J. 779, 789 (2004) ("The state action doc-
trine is analytically incoherent because, as Hohfeld and Hale demonstrated, state regulation
of so-called private conduct is always present, as a matter of analytic necessity, within a legal
order.").
85. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972) (stating that the Equal
Protection Clause only applies when the state "foster[s] or encourage[s] racial discrimina-
tion").
86. TRIBE, supra note 84, at 247.
87. Hence, the Court has stated, in the context of state regulation or oversight of pri-
vate activity, that "a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when
it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt
or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
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Consider, for example, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social ServicesY.. In DeShaney the Winnebago County Department
of Social Services monitored a young boy, Joshua DeShaney, sus-
pected of being abused by his father. 9 Despite being hospitalized
twice for suspicious injuries and monthly visits by the Department
that raised red flags, the Department chose not to intervene. 9°
Shortly after the second hospitalization, DeShaney was beaten so
severely by his father that he suffered brain damage. 9' His mother
initiated suit against the Department pursuant to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming that the Depart-
ment's failure to protect constituted a deprivation of the boy's
liberty.
92
The Court rejected the claim, holding that "a State's failure to
protect an individual against private violence simply does not consti-
tute a violation of the Due Process Clause."9 3 For the Court, the
Fourteenth Amendment simply does not apply to state inaction. In
the Court's words, the Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the State
itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without 'due
process of law,' but its language cannot fairly be extended to im-
pose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those
interests do not come to harm through other means."0
4
Justices Brennan and Blackmun sharply disagreed, emphasizing
that the Court took too limited a view of "state action." Justice
Brennan wrote, in particular, that "[m]y disagreement with the
Court arises from its failure to see that inaction can be every bit as
abusive of power as action, that oppression can result when a State un-
dertakes a vital duty and then ignores it."'95 Justice Blackmun's dissent
echoes this conclusion: "As Justice Brennan demonstrates, the facts
here involve not mere passivity, but active state intervention in the
life ofJoshua DeShaney-intervention that triggered a fundamental
duty to aid the boy once the State learned of the severe danger to
which he was exposed."9
Both Brennan and Blackmun make the narrower point that the
state, in monitoring DeShaney, affirmatively adopted a duty to
88. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
89. Id. at 192.
90. Id. at 192-93.
91. Id. at 193.
92. Id. Though DeShaney concerned the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, not the Equal Protection Clause, its analysis applies equally here.
93. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 212 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
96. Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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protect DeShaney, and should be held accountable for it.9 In this
sense both Brennan and Blackmun are addressing the issue of
whether the state can ever have a duty at all under the Fourteenth
Amendment.98 They at least argue that such duties arise when they
are voluntarily adopted by the state, as was the case here.
But, in making this point, Brennan and Blackmun show that the
Department's inaction in this case becomes radically transformed
once we accept that the Department had a duty to protect De-
Shaney. The Department's inaction in this case, given the
resounding evidence available to the state that abuse was taking
place, struck both Brennan and Blackmun as a culpable act. In
Brennan's words, the Court's conclusion allows the State of Wis-
consin to "shrug its shoulders and turn away from the harm that it
has promised to try to prevent."9 For Blackmun, the State's inac-
tion amounts to an abandonment, as DeShaney was "abandoned by
the [Department] who placed him in a dangerous predicament
and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially
nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes, 'dutifully re-
cord[] these incidents in [their] files."' For both Brennan and
Blackmun, the acknowledgement of a duty to protect transforms
the Department's inaction into an act of negligence, even reckless-
ness.
Brennan and Blackmun's reasoning in DeShaney extends to pri-
vate discrimination. Admittedly, from its inception the goal in the
Civil Rights Cases was to restrict the Equal Protection Clause to ap-
ply solely to state discrimination, and not the discrimination of
private actors. Hence its hostility toward "[i]ndividual invasion of
individual rights" as "the subject-matter of the amendment."10 0 But,
97. Justice Brennan makes an even narrower argument-that the state's attempt to
monitor DeShaney had the effect of "reliev[ing] ordinary citizens and governmental bodies
other than the Department of any sense of obligation to do anything more than report their
suspicions of child abuse to DSS." Id. at 210 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Brennan accentuates
this crowding out aspect so that the case fits more in line with cases that have suggested,
though not explicitly held, that "if a State cuts off private sources of aid and then refuses aid
itself, it cannot wash its hands of the harm that results from its inaction." Id. at 207 (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
My analysis of the case does not depend on this crowding out effect. It is sufficient that
the state undertook the duty to protect DeShaney in order to hold the state culpable for a
failure to satisfy that duty, regardless of what effect it had on others to intervene.
98. Some are skeptical of this claim. E.g., Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir.
1982) (Posner, J.) ("The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let
people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to provide services,
even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order.").
99. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
100. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). It is important to note thatJustice
Bradley's reasoning centered less on the underlying harm the Fourteenth Amendment was
meant to protect, and more on the extent of Congressional power under the Enforcement
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as DeShaney demonstrates, there is no reason why a duty to protect
citizens from private discrimination should not apply. Discrimina-
tion, like private violence, is harmful, and turning a blind eye to it
is no different analytically as an action from committing the dis-
crimination itself. The distinction between state discrimination and
private discrimination that Justice Bradley attempts to draw, there-
fore, does not rest on the state action requirement. It rests on the
ultimate interpretation of what the Equal Protection Clause pro-
tects.
Consider, for example, an account of state action premised not
on overt discrimination by the state, but based on a duty to protect
against private discrimination. Charles Black provided such an ac-
count in his 1966 Harvard Law Review Foreword. °' Under Black's
view:
[E] qual protection of the laws is denied by the state whenever
the legal regime of the state, which numbers amongst its or-
dinary police powers the power to protect the Negro against
discrimination based on his race, elects not to do so-
choosing instead to envelop and surround the discriminators
with the protection and aids of law and with the assistances of
communal life.
0 2
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment vis-a-vis state and local power. This is revealed in
Justice Bradley's statement that the Fourteenth Amendment "does not authorize congress to
create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights." Id.
101. Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action, "Equal Protection, and California's Proposi-
tion 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967). Others have followed Black's approach. E.g., Don
Herzog, The Kerr Principle, State Action, and Legal Rights, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2006)
(arguing in favor of a principle, the Kerr Principle, that "bars the state from serving as a
conduit for private parties' illegitimate preferences"); Fiss, supra note 64, at 11; Robin West,
Groups, Equal Protection and Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002, art. 8, http://
www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art8/; Kenneth Karst, Sources of Status-harm and Group Disadvan-
tage in Private Behavior, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002, art. 4, http://www.bepress.
com/ils/iss2/art4/.
102. Black, supra note 101, at 108. In his Foreword Black actually vacillates between two
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause. Under one interpretation, the one described
above, equal protection is denied when the state fails to protect against private discrimina-
tion. Professor Black, however, also provides a stronger formulation, closer to the
antisubordination principle: "If one race is, identifiably as such, substantially worse off than
others with respect to anything with which law commonly deals, then 'equal protection of
the laws,' is not being extended to that race unless and until every prudent affirmative use of
law is being made toward remedying the inequality." Id. at 97. Under this formulation, the
state not only protects against private discrimination, but also against anything that makes
persons of a certain race "substantially worse off than others with respect to anything with
which law commonly deals." It is unclear whether Black prefers the first interpretation over
the second, but suggests the second as a second-best formulation to effectuate the first, since
"no line can warrantably be drawn at any point short of the discernment [of] racist regimes."
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For Black, it is not enough that the state must not discriminate
against blacks: "When a racial minority is struggling to escape
drowning in the isolation and squalor of slum-ghetto residence,
everywhere across the country, I do not see why the refusal to
throw a life-preserver does not amount to a denial of protection.'
0 3
For Black, "state action" includes a "refusal to throw a life-
preserver." A duty to protect against private discrimination brings
that omission, that "refusal," to life as state action.
Black's failure-to-protect theory of state action was informed by
the social and political landscape of the late 1960s, when Black
wrote his Foreword and when private discrimination was more ram-
pant. It is exemplified by the subject of Black's Foreword, Reitman v.
Mulkey.'0 4 Reitman involved the adoption of a California constitu-
tional amendment, the infamous Proposition 14, which would have
protected a person's "absolute discretion" to sell his or her prop-
erty to whomever he or she chose.'05 In proposing Proposition 14
California homeowners obviously wanted the right to discriminate
on the basis of race, since Californians proposed Proposition 14
shortly after the adoption of a state fair housing law.'0 6
The Supreme Court found that the Proposition violated the
Equal Protection Clause, and for Black the state action was clear:
The state has not commanded discrimination against Ne-
groes, but is has assured the discriminator, exactly with
respect to the discrimination, of a special immunity-as com-
plete an immunity as the state can within its constitutional
forms grant-from any political assault on his practice of dis-
crimination. 107
In other words, in allowing passage of Proposition 14, the state
ensured that it would be extremely difficult for blacks to secure
good housing, since the Proposition constitutionally protected the
homeowners' right to discriminate on the basis of race. And this
act of allowance, according to Black, does not meaningfully differ
Id. at 98. For an argument that Black endorsed the second, more far reaching interpreta-
tion, see Peller & Tushnet, supra note 84, at 781-87.
103. Black, supra note 101, at 73.
104. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
105. Black, supra note 101, at 72 (quoting Proposition 14, which stated in relevant part
that "[n]either the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge,
directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent
any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such
person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.").
106. Id.
107. Id. at 79.
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from "command[ing] discrimination against Negroes" given the
reality of late 1960s California. "
Arguably the discrimination in Reitman was state discrimination,
since the state adopted Proposition 14. But Black's concern was
more with the citizen's own private discrimination-the naked at-
tempt to use California's referendum system to limit the housing
prospects of blacks. This explains Black's emphasis on the obvious-
ness of what the people of California were trying to accomplish
with Proposition 14. It also explains Black's emphasis on what he
calls the "reality principle," the need to take into account "the end-
less variations not only of reality as presently given, but of reality as
it may be manipulated and formed in the hands of people ruled by
what seems to be one of the most tenacious motives in American
life." °9 The "tenacious motives" referred to the overt racism preva-
lent in the 1960s.
The "reality principle" is normatively crucial to Black's interpre-
tation of the Equal Protection Clause for two reasons. First, the
emphasis on private discrimination gives content to the state's duty
by establishing the harm that results from the state's actions (or in
this case, inaction). It is the effects of this harm that the state must
ultimately protect against or, if it fails to do so, to remedy.
Second, the emphasis on the obviousness of the discrimination,
which represents the real bite of the "reality principle," establishes
the trigger for performing the duty. The duty does not arise if it
does not appear, from reality, that private discrimination is occur-
ring. The "reality principle," in other words, establishes the
foreseeability of the private discrimination that serves as the basis
for the duty to protect. The obvious racial discrimination rampant
in 1960s California is not unlike the obviously abusive situation in
which the Winnebago County Department of Social Services
placed young DeShaney by continually returning him to his father.
In both situations the state action arises when the state "shrug[s] its
shoulders and turn [s] away from the harm that it has promised to
try to prevent."
108. Id.
109. Id. at 90-91. Consider, for example, another case that turns on the "reality princi-
ple"-Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer the Court invalidated a Colorado state
constitutional amendment that would have prevented any city or town from enacting local
ordinances to protect homosexuals against discrimination. Id. The Court's invalidation of
the amendment stemmed, in part, from the fact that the amendment reflected an obvious
"hare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group," in this case, the animosity the
amendment directed towards homosexuals in Colorado. Id. at 634 (quoting U.S. Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
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b. Subordination as Social Disaster
The state action requirement does not preclude a conception of
the Equal Protection Clause as a duty. But the antisubordination
principle requires more than a broadening of the Equal Protection
Clause. It requires a whole new theory of state obligation.
In order to see why, consider a case truer to Black's concerns:
Shelley v. Kraemer."° Shelley v. Kraemer concerned land covenants that
restricted homeowners from selling their homes to blacks. " ' The
Supreme Court held that the enforcement of these covenants by
Missouri courts was unconstitutional, 2 though the basis for this
holding is a mystery, since the covenants were private restrictions
that ran with the land. 1 3 Laurence Tribe attempts to fill in the
blanks by envisioning the Missouri courts' enforcement as discrimina-
tory, insofar as Missouri courts found other restrictive covenants as
invalid as a restraint on alienability." 4 The Court, however, did not
adopt this rationale, nor did it find such discriminatory enforce-
ment.
The case, however, perfectly fits Black's interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause. Given 1940s America, it is clear that the
restrictive covenants were enacted to prevent blacks from moving
into white neighborhoods. Moreover, one could read the Missouri
court's enforcement of the restrictive covenants as at least a tacit
approval of this private discrimination. Though the discrimination
does not amount to state discrimination so long as Missouri courts
enforced other kinds of restrictive covenants equally, the court's
passivity in the face of this private discrimination would result in a
violation of Black's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Consider, however, a different Shelley scenario. Assume, instead
of racially restrictive covenants, that families in Missouri had an
informal practice of leaving their property to their children (or
other familial heirs). In addition, assume that the purpose of the
110. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
111. Id. at 4.
112. Id. at 23.
113. So much so that Owen Fiss has noted that "on an analytic level Shelley v. Kraemeris
generally deemed to be an extraordinarily difficult case-the Finnegans Wake of constitu-
tional law." Fiss, supra note 8, at 137 (quoting Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: Equal in Origin and
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REv. 143,
148 (1964)); see also Lino A. Graglia, State Action: Constitutional Phoenix, 67 WASH. U. L.Q.
777, 788 (1989) (describing Shelley v. Kraemer as an example "that [the Court] is exempt
from any requirement that its opinions make sense"); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent
and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 966 (1989) ("Shelley v Kraemeris generally
acknowledged to be the most interesting and problematic of the so-called state action
cases.").
114. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 260.
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practice was not to exclude blacks (or, more precisely, exclusively
blacks). Assume instead that it reflected a desire on the part of
Missouri homeowners to provide for their children and keep their
estates within their families. Also assume that this does not present
any housing problems for anyone in Missouri until an unforesee-
able refugee group enters the state looking for housing. Because of
this practice, the refugees cannot get adequate housing in the
state."15
In this alternate Shelley scenario, the obvious private discrimina-
tion that animates Black's duty is not present. Though, arguably,
private discrimination exists, it is not based on any animus against
any particular group. It is instead based on promoting a different
value: protecting one's children and preserving family ownership.
Promoting this value is, in fact, a legitimate exercise of one's right
of alienability-an important property right. Moreover, the prac-
tice was adopted without any knowledge of the refugee group (or
any other group) entering the community. The refugee process
was completely unforeseeable. It would follow that, under Black's
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, no duty to protect
was triggered. There is no "failure" to protect, and thus no state
action.
This is not the case for the antisubordination principle. Since
the practice subordinates the group on the basis of their status
(since, as refugees, they have no familial ties to the community
whatsoever) by denying housing, then the state must affirmatively
enjoin the informal practice.
115. The example may seem far-fetched, but is similar to the facts in Hawaii Housing Au-
thority v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229 (1984), where the Court held that a state law to confiscate by
eminent domain land owned by a small number of landowners and redistribute it to the
wider population did not run afoul of the "public use" requirement of the Takings Clause.
As in the example above, the concentration in land severely restricted the availability of
land. Id. The Court noted that "the State and Federal Governments owned almost 49% of
the State's land, [and] another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners." Id. at
232.
Consider also housing codes designed to help low-income tenants in slum housing but
that have the effect of limiting the profitability of low-income housing. See Bruce Ackerman,
Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and
Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1160 (1971) ("[C]ode enforcement unfairly
requires a relatively small landlord class-principally composed of petty bourgeois-to pay a
disproportionately large share of society's debt to the poor. This argument is not without
force ... ."). As in my social practice example, the issue is burdening individuals regardless
of their culpability-in Ackerman's case, landlords who provide low-income housing.
Finally, another similar case, one involving individuals in refugee-like conditions, is Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), which concerned whether the children of illegal immigrants
could be barred from Texas elementary schools. I address Plyler in more detail below. See
infra Section 11(B) (2) (c).
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This result under the antisubordination principle brings to the
fore the reason why the transactional perspective cannot support
its requirements. At its base, the transactional perspective is con-
cerned with the culpable consequences of an action: The duty to
remedy is an expression of a general concern with how persons
(and the state) should act when transacting with others. Black's
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause fits within this
scheme because, even though it is cognized as a duty, it is still con-
cerned with the culpable consequences of the state's action (or
inaction)-hence the importance of the "reality" of private dis-
crimination. The state cannot act to protect if the harmful private
discrimination that triggers the duty does not foreseeably arise.
The antisubordination principle, however, concerns itself not
with state action but with social conditions. It therefore does not
matter what the state did or did not do to be culpable for a subor-
dinating condition, or whether it should have recognized its duty
to act or not. All that matters is the manifestation of the social
condition. The state must act if a subordinating condition arises
regardless of its causes.
The alternate Shelley example also reveals one more aspect of the
antisubordination principle and its structural perspective. Unlike
in Reitman or in Shelley v. Kraemer, the offending social condition in
the alternative Shelley example did not arise from wrongdoing, ei-
ther private or public. It instead arose naturally, as an unintended
consequence of the exercise of the rights of Missouri's citizens. It is
important to emphasize that there exists no improper discrimina-
tory intent in the actions of the Missouri citizens. The social
practice described above was assumed to be exercised in the ut-
most good faith with no animus at all towards the refugees.
Subordination, therefore, can arise from what can be called a
"social disaster." Like a natural disaster, it can arise apart from hu-
man action altogether. This does not mean that human action
cannot be a cause of subordination. In the alternative Shelley ex-
ample, it clearly was. It means that subordination can arise not only
from a lack of any culpable wrongdoing, but from the exercise of
otherwise legitimate rights-in this case the basic property rights of
the citizens of Missouri.
Thus, the basis for remedying such social disasters cannot be
wrongdoing. Wrongdoing played no part in the alternate Shelley
example. Our obligation to remedy the situation is instead akin to
remedying the victims of natural disasters. Issues of blame, which
are so crucial in the context of the transactional perspective, dis-
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appear when a natural or social disaster is involved. No one can
blame the weather.
I conclude by making one last and crucial point. As the alternate
Shelley example shows, subordination can arise from the exercise of
important rights, and the antisubordination principle may require
frustration of these rights. In the alternate Shelley case, the state
should not enforce the informal practice at issue. Notice, however,
that the attempt to enforce the informal practice is not wrong be-
cause it conflicts with the antisubordination principle. In other
words, failing to enforce these rights does not change the charac-
ter of the right into wrongdoing. Rather, the antisubordination
principle in this instance overrides those rights.
2. Affirmative Action
Once the duty to intervene under the antisubordination princi-
ple has been established, the state must take steps to eradicate
subordination. These steps constitute affirmative action.
Affirmative action has been traditionally defined as:
1. any governmental policy that
2. grants preferential treatment to persons
3. on the basis of classifications such as race and sex.
I want to emphasize two aspects of this definition. First, it highlights
governmental affirmative action as constitutionally significant. Pri-
vate affirmative action raises no issues under the Equal Protection
Clause. Second, it highlights that the essence of affirmative action
lies in its preferential treatment. It is this aspect that binds affirma-
tive action in all of its forms, such as quotas, and "points" systems. At
the same time, this aspect represents affirmative action's core consti-
tutional deficiency. "Preferential treatment," is, at base, just a form
of discrimination, and all discrimination on the basis of classifica-
tions such as race and sex are presumptive violations of the Equal
Protection Clause.
I want to propose instead a slightly different definition of affirma-
tive action, one that emphasizes its rationale rather than its flaws.
I conceive of affirmative action as:
1. any government policy that
2. eradicates social conditions that
3. subordinate social positions in society.
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This definition differs slightly from the one above in one impor-
tant respect.'16 In my prior definition, I listed the third prong as
"classifications such as race or sex," a prong informed more by the
current antidiscrimination interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause than the antisubordination principle. I have replaced this
prong with the idea of subordinated social positions, which are not
always "classifications such as race or sex." The other two prongs
are substantially (or exactly) the same. The focus remains on gov-
ernmental forms of affirmative action, and the appeal to the
eradication of subordinating social conditions will necessarily re-
quire preferential treatment. Under any affirmative action
measure, one group will get better treatment than others on the
basis of group membership.
As now defined, affirmative action represents the remedial prin-
ciple of the antisubordination principle. It defines and encompasses
all specific remedial policies to combat subordination.
Given the antisubordination principle's different social perspec-
tive, it therefore follows that affirmative action differs from the
remedial principle of the antidiscrimination principle and its
transactional perspective. Below I will discuss five specific ways in
which it differs.
Before I do, however, I want to briefly clarify one aspect of the
remedial principle of the antidiscrimination principle, to further
clarify affirmative action and its differences.
The remedial principle of the antidiscrimination principle is,
again, corrective: It seeks to restore the particular victims of the
state's wrongdoing to their previous positions before the wrongdo-
ing occurred. Under this perspective, the remedy is context limited.
It looks solely at the wrongdoing in question and the particular per-
sons harmed by that wrongdoing. The transaction at issue
represents the complete universe of the transactional principle.
For the most part, no other consideration matters."
7
In contrast, affirmative action looks to the remedying of a social
condition, regardless of the context. Affirmative action, therefore,
is not restricted in any way by a particular event (such as wrongdo-
ing) or the particular persons affected in fact by the condition. It
only looks to the condition itself.
116. I will go into greater detail in the next Part.
117. I say "for the most part" because some considerations outside the transaction may
be relevant. One can imagine, for example, a contract that requires as a condition the per-
formance of some act by a third party. The point is simply that a transactional perspective
takes the transaction as primary. Outside considerations are taken into account only if the
transaction itself takes these considerations into account.
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a. Prospective
In remedying a subordinating social condition, the affirmative
action looks prospectively, rather than retrospectively. The goal is
not to undo the past, but to remake the present, so that the subor-
dinating social condition does not continue. The unabashed goal
of affirmative action is "social engineering rather [than] a desire to
implement a remedy."" 8
Because of this prospective outlook, affirmative action is less
concerned with the details of the causes of the subordinating con-
dition in question. It does not matter, for the most part, how it
came about. There is no need, therefore, to find "identified dis-
crimination" as a predicate for affirmative action." 9 A present
subordinating social condition is sufficient.
b. Continuous
Since affirmative action is not compensatory, it is not time-
limited. It can continue so long as the subordinating condition
(the true predicate of affirmative action) persists.' 20 Hence, Justice
O'Connor's belief that affirmative action "must be limited in time"
is mistaken.'
2'
At the same time, the fact that affirmative action is not time-
limited does not mean that affirmative action does not have, to use
Justice O'Connor's words, a "logical end point.', 22 Rather, whether
affirmative action should end in any particular instance will de-
pend on whether the subordination it is attempting to eradicate
continues to persist. A measure of the situation must be taken,
rather than an imposition of a sunset or deadline. When subordi-
nation ends, affirmative action must end as well.
The ending of a particular affirmative action scheme, moreover,
does not foreclose the possibility of future affirmative action.
118. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 951 (5th Cir. 1996) (criticizing the University of
Texas Law School's affirmative action program, stating that, since the program applies to
out-of-state and private school students, the program does not address past state discrimina-
tion but instead "an inference is raised that the program was the result of racial social
engineering rather [than] a desire to implement a remedy").
119. Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526-27 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
120. But one can question the effectiveness of a particular affirmative action scheme if
subordination continues to persist.
121. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
122. Id. at 342.
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Subordination can resurface in unexpected ways, and there is no
reason to limit the remedies necessary to combat it.
c. Inter-institutional
By focusing on the structure of society, affirmative action takes
an inter-institutional perspective. Because a variety of institutions
affect important goods in society, affirmative action in one institu-
tion can be used to eradicate distortions in an altogether different
institution. To state the point more abstractly, it may be the case
that in order to remedy subordination in institution A, affirmative
action may have to turn not to the institution itself but to another
institution, institution B.
This explains and justifies, for example, one of the original pur-
poses of the affirmative action program challenged in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke. 23 In Bakke the Court struck down a
two-tracked medical school admissions policy designed to set aside
reserved places for minority and disadvantaged medical students so
that, among other things, it could "increas[e] the number of phy-
sicians who will practice in communities currently underserved.",
2 4
Under the Medical School's theory, providing treatment for un-
derprivileged groups will not only require making more personnel
and resources available, but also training doctors within the un-
derprivileged group so that medical attention is more effectively
administered. The admissions policy suggests that doctors from
underprivileged groups may have special insights into the medical
needs of the underprivileged group, and that they may employ
these insights to better treat existing health problems. Moreover,
doctors from underprivileged groups may also feel more motivated
to serve underprivileged groups than other doctors.1 2 5 In other
words, the admissions policy in Bakke looks to one problem in soci-
ety, the unequal distribution of quality medical treatment in
society, and looks to another institution, in this case medical school
admissions, as a means to eradicate that condition.
123. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
124. Id. at 306, 310.
125. For example, at least one doctor who benefited from the affirmative action pro-
gram, Dr. Patrick Chavis, opened an OB/GYN clinic serving the poor in Compton. See
Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TIMES,June 11, 1995, at 36.
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While Justice Powell's Bakke opinion rejected this rationale,126
Justice O'Connor's Grutter opinion embraces it. Speaking in the
law school context, Justice O'Connor writes that:
[U]niversities, and in particular, law schools, represent the
training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders...
The pattern is even more striking when it comes to highly se-
lective law schools. A handful of these schools accounts for 25
of the 100 United States Senators, 74 United States Courts of
Appeals judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United
States District Courtjudges.
2 7
Notice the link Justice O'Connor creates between one area of
concern (the deficit of minority leaders) to another (law school
admissions). Both represent two different institutional spheres-
governmental offices and law school classrooms. Yet, in examining
the problem of the dearth of minority political leaders, Justice
O'Connor does not narrow her focus to the pool of viable candi-
dates, shrugging her shoulders when she finds this pool wanting.
She instead recognizes that to address this problem, the path that
allows persons to be in a position to become political leaders, that
is, the path to law school, must employ affirmative action to enhance
the candidate pool.
Though the inter-institutionality of affirmative action frees it to
consider institutions which lie outside the bounds of other subor-
dinating institutions, it also requires an analysis of whether the
proposed changes in B do affect A in the desired way. Here princi-
ples of efficiency and cost avoidance may be important-
alternatives such as remaining within A to remedy the social condi-
tion at issue may determine whether one should resort to B. But
this is a question of how to correct subordination efficaciously, not
whether it is appropriate to pierce the boundaries of A.
126. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306, 310. Ironically, Justice O'Connor notes this rejection, writ-
ing that "Justice Powell rejected an interest in 'increasing the number of physicians who will
practice in communities currently underserved,' concluding that even if such an interest
could be compelling in some circumstances the program under review was not 'geared to
promote that goal."' Gutter, 539 U.S. at 324. One can question whether the University of
Michigan's law school admissions policy is "geared" to promote an increase in underrepre-
sented elected officials and judges, rather than just produce more minority lawyers.
127. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
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d. Disaggregation of Victim and Beneficiary
Affirmative action disaggregates the persons who are directly vic-
timized by the subordinating condition and those that benefit from
affirmative action.
Under affirmative action, some of the persons who benefit have
suffered no harm from their subordinated status. A recent immi-
grant, for example, may not have experienced any of
subordination's effects, especially if the immigrant has just arrived.
This also may be true for a middle to upper-class member of the
subordinated group, who may have escaped contexts in which sub-
ordinating effects exist (e.g., ghetto neighborhoods, poor public
education, low-income jobs, etc.). While subordination may have
existed within their family histories, it may have been so distant
that it has no effect on their current condition. In fact, in both
cases, if affirmative action is sufficiently widespread, these persons
may be relatively advantaged because of their group membership
rather than disadvantaged by it.12
Some have criticized affirmative action for benefiting persons
like the persons described above, rather than those truly disadvan-
taged by subordination. 2 9 In the college admissions context, for
example, Deborah Malamud has noted (though not criticized) the
fact that race-based admission policies often follow "the principle
of the top of the bottom"-"affrmative action programs tend to
benefit the best-off among those who have been deemed suffi-
128. A recent study has shown, in fact, that recent immigrants constitute a substantial
number of the beneficiaries of affirmative action at elite colleges and universities. See Doug-
las S. Massey et al., Black Immigrants and Black Natives Attending Selective Colleges and Universities
in the United States, 113 AM. J. EDUC. 243 (2007). The authors conclude that whether such
students are "worthy beneficiaries of affirmative action ... rests largely on a moral judgment
about whether the policy" is a form of restitution for past racial injustice or a mechanism to
ensure that selective schools continue to reflect the racial and ethnic diversity of a nation
that is being transformed by immigration." Id. at 269. I argue below that they are worthy
beneficiaries, but for a third rationale-the eradication of subordination.
129. E.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 538 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[T] hose who are the most disadvantaged ... are the least likely to receive any benefit from
the special privilege."); see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE
INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 115 (1987) (stating that race- or ethnic-
ity-based affirmative action would "enhance the opportunities of the more advantaged
without addressing the problems of the truly disadvantaged"); Randall Kennedy, Commen-
tary, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327,
1333 (1986) (noting that "[an] objection to affirmative action is that it frequently aids those
blacks who need it least and who can least plausibly claim to suffer the vestiges of past dis-
crimination-the offspring of black middle-class parents seeking preferential treatment in
admission to elite universities and black entrepreneurs seeking guaranteed set-asides for
minority contractors on projects supported by the federal government," but noting that
"[t] his objection too is unpersuasive" (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 448)).
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ciently disadvantaged to be eligible for affirmative action.""" The
source of this uneasiness flows from the fact that the persons who
are benefited are not affected at all by the subordinated condition,
and that these benefits should be reserved for the truly disadvan-
taged.
This uneasiness is unjustified. Helping the "truly" disadvantaged
may entail benefiting those who are not affected by the subordinat-
ing condition at all, just as helping the truly disadvantaged may
entail turning to an institution that does not have any relation to
the true subordinating institution. In both cases effectively ending
subordination should not be limited to the particular persons or
institutions that touch it. Eradicating subordination may entail
employing unconventional persons as well as institutions.
Consider an example in the disability context. Suppose that a
restaurant owner wants to increase access to his restaurant for the
disabled. The owner decides that the best way to do so is by con-
structing a ramp that allows wheelchair access to the restaurant,
but, due to his limitations as a carpenter, the owner is not able to
build the ramp himself. The restaurant owner instead hires a con-
tractor that builds the ramp for him who charges a fee for her
services.
In this example a person wants to help a disadvantaged group,
the disabled, but in doing so benefits a third party, the contractor,
even though the third party is not necessarily disabled. It may be
true that the fee only represents a form of compensation for the
contractor's hard work and time, but it remains a benefit. The con-
tractor receives work she would not have otherwise received and
will most likely profit from it.
This "contractor" view should also apply to the recent immigrant
and middle to upper-class examples above. They too are "con-
tracted" to ameliorate the subordinated condition of persons in
society, even though they themselves, like the contractor, are not
necessarily affected by the condition.
But what do affirmative action "contractors" provide? In the col-
lege admissions context, for example, placing members of the
subordinated group in elite institutions helps to dispel a presump-
tion that certain employment positions or prestigious positions are
closed off to the subordinated group. Justice O'Connor elaborates
on this benefit in Grutter, in the context of the role law school plays
in cultivating national leaders:
130. Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EIUC.
452, 458 (1997).
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In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes
of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race
and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have
confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institu-
tions that provide this training."'
In this brief passage Justice O'Connor emphasizes not only the
openness of law school admissions, but the appearance of openness.
The appearance of openness instills actual "confidence in the
openness and integrity" of law school admissions-that is, it re-
moves the presumption in society that such institutions are
reserved for only some members of society.
This method of affirmative action does much more than pro-
mote "confidence." It also has two other important material
benefits. First, it provides incentives for those in the subordinated
group to strive for admission in those elite institutions, if not
higher. The appearance of openness of society's most exclusive in-
stitutions broadens the horizons of even the most disadvantaged
within the subordinated group. Moreover, as these members move
onto other elite institutions, such as taking political and judicial
office, the goals conceivable (and achievable) for the most disad-
vantaged further broaden. They too can, in the future, have the
possibility of taking their place within these institutions. Like a
ramp, these examples raise the expectations of all members of a
subordinated group.
Second, the actual inclusion of members of the subordinated
group (even advantaged ones) in elite institutions helps to dissolve
stereotypes about members within the subordinated group and
lead to better cross-group understanding.132 This, in turn, can lead
to greater incentives for society to alleviate the subordinated status
of its disadvantaged members, since they will better understand,
and be sympathetic to, their plight. As Justice O'Connor notes,
"It] hese benefits are substantial."
1 33
There are, however, disadvantages, as the use of affirmative ac-
tion may cause society to view the subordinated group even more
unfavorably. As Justice Thomas points out in his concurrence in
131. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332 (emphasis added).
132. Daniel Sabbagh makes a similar point. See Daniel Sabbagh, Affirmative Action and
the Group-Disadvantaging Principle, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002, art. 14, at 5,
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artl4/ ("[L]essening the correlation between race and
occupational status, affirmative action might help reduce the functionality of such stereo-
types.").
133. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
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Adarand, affirmative action programs may "stamp minorities with a
badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies
or to adopt an attitude that they are 'entitled' to preferences.
' '1 4
The picture of stigma Justice Thomas paints is overstated, since not
everyone will openly question the abilities of persons from subor-
dinated groups. It suggests a societal mean-spiritedness that,
though present, is not as pervasive as Justice Thomas suggests. But
what Justice Thomas describes is substantial. Affirmative action,
while conveying an appearance of openness, may further stigma-
tize subordinated persons by casting a cloud on their abilities.'
3
While acknowledging the disadvantages of affirmative action, it
is important to weigh them against affirmative action's advantages.
Though no social policy is perfect, one should not ignore the fact
that these placements can, on the whole, represent real gains for
the status of subordinated groups, even its most disadvantaged
members.
Notice, however, that the arguments above do not narrow their
focus to the direct benefits affirmative action provides to its most
disadvantaged members. Rather, the focus for both Justice
O'Connor and Justice Thomas is on affirmative action's effect on
the subordination of blacks as a whole, as it should be.
134. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J. concur-
ring in part and concurring in. the judgment). Justice Thomas's response to Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Grutter focuses more narrowly on the hurt to the beneficiaries them-
selves:
When blacks take positions in the highest places of government, industry, or acade-
mia, it is an open question today whether their skin color played a part in their
advancement. The question itself is the stigma-because either racial discrimination
did play a role, in which case the person may be deemed "otherwise unqualified," or
it did not, in which case asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who
would succeed without discrimination. Is this what the Court means by "visibly open?"
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas,J.).
135. However, I am reminded ofJed Rubenfeld's response to this argument:
To have extremely few black students at some of our most prestigious academic insti-
tutions would also promote notions of racial inferiority. There is something
extremely odd going on when this fact is omitted from the analysis. It is as if one were
to oppose seat belt laws on the ground that seat belts can lead to physical injury in
the event of an accident-without even trying to assess whether the alternatives one
supports would result in more injuries.
Rubenfeld, supra note 11, at 446-47.
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e. Disaggregation of Injurer and Those Burdened
Affirmative action also disaggregates the persons who caused
subordination and those burdened by affirmative action. In some
cases affirmative action will burden persons completely innocent of
existing subordination.
This is the fundamental issue in determining the permissibility
of affirmative action, and a source of great concern and anguish in
many affirmative action cases.' 36 As Justice Powell put it in Bakke,
"there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons ... to
bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making."
37
Because of this concern, the Court has consistently called attention
to the innocent persons harmed by affirmative action: the innocent
applicant who is denied medical school admission,'3 the innocent
contractor that is denied a government contract,3 9 and the young
child who must be bused away from his or her neighborhood
school.
40
Despite these concerns, the fact that affirmative action burdens
innocent persons poses no theoretical problem for affirmative ac-
tion. While, under a transactional perspective, any obligation to
remedy a situation must turn on the culpability of the parties in-
volved, no such limitation applies to the antisubordination
principle. Only the existence of a subordinating condition matters,
and, though these innocent persons cannot be called "contractors"
in any meaningful sense, they may have to be commandeered in or-
der to eradicate subordination.
This "commandeering" aspect of affirmative action may strike
one as going too far. If affirmative action can forcibly burden inno-
cent persons to end subordination, what restrictions, if any, apply
136. Of course, not all burdens imposed by affirmative action are compelling, and the
interests that affirmative action infringe on may not be entitled to any legal protection. I
focus here on cases in which the burdens imposed by affirmative action are significant.
137. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 310 ("[T]he purpose of helping certain groups whom the facility of the Davis
Medical School perceived as victims of 'societal discrimination' does not justify a classifica-
tion that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no responsibility
for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have
suffered.").
139. E.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 270 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("When the extirpation of
lingering discriminatory effects is thought to require a catchup mechanism, like the racially
preferential inducement under the statutes considered here, the result may be that some
members of the historically favored race are hurt by that remedial mechanism, however
innocent they may be of any personal responsibility for any discriminatory conduct.").
140. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971) ("It
hardly needs stating that the limits on [school bus] time of travel will vary with many factors,
but probably with none more than the age of the students.").
[VOL. 41:3
Subordination and the Fortuity of Our Circumstances 635
to affirmative action in the face of subordination? Can affirmative
action do anything?
The answer is no. Affirmative action is limited by the reason-
ableness of the sacrifices it imposes on persons to help eliminate
subordination. Some sacrifices may be unreasonable if (1) other,
lesser sacrifices can be used to achieve the same (or better) results
or (2) the magnitude of the sacrifice does not justify the resultant
lessening of subordination. In both cases it is possible that the sac-
rifice may be too much to ask. In this way affirmative action can
take into account the interests of innocent persons burdened by
affirmative action's requirements.
The reasonableness of the sacrifice, however, is measured
against what can be called a public obligation"' on the part of per-
sons to eliminate subordination, and I want to conclude this Part
by briefly discussing it.
Under the transactional perspective, the state is an entity distinct
from persons, with its own separate capacity to commit wrongdo-
ing. Much of the Constitution reflects this view of the state, since
many of the prohibitions (and duties) outlined in the Constitution
are directed against the federal government and, through the
Fourteenth Amendment, to state governments. This view of the
state permeates decisions such as DeShaney. Consider Justice
Rehnquist's words in DeShaney, discussing the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment: "Like its counterpart in the Fifth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was intended to prevent government 'from abusing [its]
power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.' Its purpose
was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State pro-
tected them from each other."
142
The state also represents a distinct entity under a structural per-
spective, but plays a different role. A structural perspective looks at
the state as a means by which society effectuates its obligations. It is
true that the state, because its actions carry the force of law, differs
fundamentally from other means of eradicating subordination. In
particular, the state's actions carry a legitimacy that other private
actions lack, because they purport to be authorized by the people.
141. The concept of a public obligation is analytically similar to what Cass Sunstein calls
a "constitutional commitment." See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 179 (2004) (discussing
the concept); see alsOJED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT 194 (2001) ("Brown was rightly decided because ending segregation was
a matter of living up, at long last, to the nation's constitutional commitment to end the
legalized degradation of blacks.").
142. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989)
(citations omitted, emphasis added).
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For that reason, the state is, and remains, the pre-eminent site
where society expresses and acts upon its fundamental commit-
ments.
Analytically, however, under the antisubordination principle the
state is simply a means to end subordination. It is an important,
primary, and preferred means. Arguably it should be the only
means to eradicate subordination because of its inherent legiti-
macy. But it is a means nonetheless.
The subtle shift from the state as a violator to just a means under
the antisubordination principle reveals that the antisubordination
principle's obligation to eradicate subordination does not, in fact,
rest in the state. It ultimately rests in the public itself. That is why I
refer to this obligation as a public obligation-it is the state's obliga-
tion only insofar as it represents the public's means of achieving its
obligation.
To evaluate the reasonableness of the sacrifices imposed by af-
firmative action is to ultimately weigh these sacrifices against this
public obligation. And in order to do so, one must turn to the nor-
mative basis of that obligation. In other words, the reasonableness
of affirmative action turns on the normative considerations that
ground our public obligation, and whether those considerations
sufficiently override the sacrifices imposed on the innocent indi-
vidual burdened.
So far in this Article I have only described the antisubordination
principle-what it means, when it applies, and how it operates. But
to get at the issue of the reasonableness of the sacrifices the anti-
subordination principle imposes through affirmative action, we
have to turn from description to justification. We need to answer
why the public has an obligation to eradicate subordination.
This question, to borrow a phrase from Herbert Wechsler, is the
"heart of the issue" of affirmative action, a "conflict in human
claims of high dimension."043 I will turn to this issue in the next
Part.
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE FORTUITY OF OUR
CIRCUMSTANCES
The antisubordination principle represents one interpretation
of a commitment to equality, but it can entail great sacrifices. It
asks of some members of society to contribute to the eradication of
143. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles ofConstitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1,
34 (1959).
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subordination even if they did not contribute in any way to the exis-
tence of the condition. One should not trivialize these costs. A
commitment against subordination will, in some instances, disad-
vantage individuals substantially.
The sacrifices entailed in a commitment against subordination,
however, are particularly problematic because they not only bur-
den persons in society, but they presumptively violate another
important conception of equality, a commitment against discrimi-
nation. The antisubordination principle both promotes and
frustrates equality. What is needed, therefore, is an appropriate
basis for understanding the normative importance of the antisub-
ordination principle, a basis that allows us to adjudicate between
the antisubordination principle and the antidiscrimination princi-
ple, as well as adjudicate between the requirements of the
antisubordination principle and other important interests.
In what follows I will attempt to root this basis in a special fact
about our social circumstances, namely the fact that our prospects
as persons in society are based on the fortuitous nature of the cir-
cumstances into which we are born. This fact, I will argue, not only
situates our equality concerns but also gives us a way to adjudicate
between our commitment against subordination and other sub-
stantive ends in society.
A. The Antidiscrimination Principle
1. The Theory of Harm
The antidiscrimination principle has been traditionally defined
as a principle that prohibits the differential treatment of persons
on the basis of race or ethnic origin.1 44 It is rooted in our experi-
ence with slavery and Jim Crow laws, and therefore reflects a
concern with our most egregious violations of the principle.
1 45
144. E.g., City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) ("The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as nothing
compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the source of those effects,
which is the tendency-fatal to a Nation such as ours-to classify and judge men and women
on the basis of their country of origin or the color of their skin."); see also Paul Brest, Fore-
word: In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1 (1976).
145. My discussion of the antidiscrimination principle is distinct from current doctrine,
which takes an anticlassificationist cast. Under current Supreme Court scrutiny, all racial
classifications are presumptively invalid unless their use satisfies strict scrutiny, which means
they are only permissible if their use is "narrowly tailored to further compelling governmen-
tal interests." See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); see a/soJohnson v. California,
543 U.S. 499, 505-06 (2005). The Court has only identified three governmental interests
sufficient to justify racial classification: (1) national security, see Korematsu v. United States,
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The antidiscrimination principle prohibits the differential
treatment of persons on the basis of classifications that are both
(1) ascriptive and (2) irrelevant as a basis for treatment. It repre-
sents a special claim about the equal status of persons before the
state.
To understand this claim one must keep in mind the antidis-
crimination principle's transactional perspective. The
antidiscrimination principle's primary subject is a discrete inter-
action between the state and an individual. It looks specifically at
the reasons that underlie state transactions with individuals; in
other words, in how the state justifies its treatment of individuals
that are affected by its actions. In this way the antidiscrimination
principle concerns itself, to borrow Owen Fiss's terms, with
"means-ends rationality."146
Moreover, the antidiscrimination principle's transactional per-
spective shifts the focus away from a societal condition to the
person affected. In particular, it looks to how the person himself is
affected by the state action in question and whether the person, in
fact, suffers injury from the actions of the state. It therefore does
not, as in the antisubordination principle, look at the potential
harms produced by the persistence of subordination. The antidis-
crimination principle actually calculates, as much as practicable,
the individual harms that flow from the state's discriminatory ac-
tions.
It follows from its transactional perspective that the antidis-
crimination principle defines (1) ascription and (2) irrelevance
differently than does the antisubordination principle.
323 U.S. 214 (1944); (2) to remedy past discrimination, see City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989); and (3) diversity in higher education, see Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). The Court has rejected the following governmental interests:
(1) the best interests of the child, see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984);
(2) diversity of faculty and the promotion of minority role models, see Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1986); and (3) perhaps more distressingly, racial integration
in elementary education, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.
Ct. 2738 (2007). But see id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The plurality opinion is at
least open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the
problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion.").
A flat presumptive ban on racial classifications admittedly may vindicate the antisubordi-
nation principle as well as the antidiscrimination principle. SeeJack M. Balkin & Reva B.
Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination, ISSUES IN
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002, art. 11, at 3, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artll/.
Banning racial classifications may make it harder for race to gain a foothold as a device for
subordination. But the purpose of this Section is to take the antidiscrimination principle as
it is apart from doctrine or whatever instrumental role it can play for the antisubordination
principle.
146. Fiss, supra note 8, at 143.
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a. Ascription
The antidiscrimination principle defines ascription to mean
classifications that are based on aspects of the person that are
completely independent of the affected person. This is often rep-
resented as classifications that are beyond the control of the
individual. 1
47
Control, however, fails to fully capture the sense of ascription
that animates the antidiscrimination principle's concern with it. In
some instances, such as gender, one has some control of their clas-
sification.
Instead, the metaphor of "control" captures the sense in which
these classifications are not chosen or otherwise flow from the ac-
tions or beliefs of the person. They instead attach in spite of the
reasons a person may (or may not) have to be classified in that way.
As Justice Stewart writes in Fullilove v. Klutznick in the context of
race and alienage: "The color of a person's skin and the country of
his origin are immutable facts that bear no relation to ability, advan-
tage, disadvantage, moral culpability, or any other characteristics of
constitutionally permissible interest to government.",4
As Justice Stewart notes, immutable characteristics like race have
this quality, but other characteristics do as well, such as religious
affiliation in some cases, where the individual is born into the clas-
sification. Thus, like in structural ascription, the concern with
ascription by the antidiscrimination principle is a concern with its
agent-independent nature.
The antidiscrimination principle, however, makes a slightly dif-
ferent responsibility claim than the antisubordination principle.
Under the antisubordination principle, the agent is not held re-
sponsible for creating a societal condition that made membership
in a group a disadvantaged position. The antisubordination prin-
ciple looks to how institutions and practices advantage or
disadvantage group membership, and looks to whether the indi-
viduals disadvantaged could be held responsible for creating this
subordinating effect.
147. Eg., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (noting
that illegitimacy is considered a suspect classification because, in part, "illegitimacy is beyond
the individual's control").
148. 448 U.S. 448, 525 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164, 175 (1972)) ("[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable charac-
teristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon
the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate 'the basic con-
cept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility....').
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In contrast, the antidiscrimination principle focuses on whether
the individual's classification is based on characteristics that can be
attributable to the individual. The focus shifts from the significance
of the classification to its acquisition-whether the individual
gained the classification based on his or her actions. For example,
a person may not be responsible for the significance that a religion
may have in society, but he may be responsible for becoming a
member of a religion, insofar as he decides to adhere to it.1 49 The
opposite is also true, as when racists emphasize race as having so-
cial significance when no person has any control in its acquisition.
b. Irrelevance
The antidiscrimination principle also understands irrelevance
differently, in terms of contextual rationality rather than individual
welfare. It looks to see if, within the given context of a transaction,
the classification presents a rational basis for the differential treat-
ment. The emphasis on contextual rationality does not mean that
the use of the classification of the person must be perfectly ra-
tional. As long as there is a reason, within a given context, to see
the classification as important to treating persons differently, then
it is relevant. Irrelevance under the antidiscrimination principle,
therefore, has the flexibility to embrace the complexity of different
contexts, since what may not be relevant in one context may be
relevant in another.50 The antidiscrimination principle can tell the
difference between a pat on the back and an assault.
To understand the difference between contextual rationality and
structural rationality, consider again the racial profiling example.
Earlier I argued that racial profiling should be prohibited because
it created a social condition in which persons were considered un-
justifiably dangerous because of their race. The antisubordination
principle considered the condition unjustified because one's race
should not determine their social standing in society, even if racial
profiling was rational as a crime prevention tool.
The antidiscrimination principle, however, would permit ra-
tional racial profiling. Even if the basis for the profiling were an
149. Note, however, that persons may not be responsible in this sense if they are born
into the religion, if religion is considered a quasi-ethnic group (e.g., Judaism and most
Christian sects have this quality). However, if a person continues to follow a born-into relig-
ion, then responsibility for choosing that religion can attach.
150. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 1, 13-17 (2002) (describing importance of context); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at
327 ("Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal
Protection Clause.").
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ascriptive classification of the person, the antidiscrimination prin-
ciple would allow the practice if it was, in fact, based on evidence
that persons of certain races were more likely to commit crimes. 15
Though such a conclusion may conflict with one's stance to-
wards racial profiling, analytically the practice does not differ from
other examples of rational targeting based on ascriptive classifica-
tions. From the perspective of the antidiscrimination principle,
racial profiling does not differ from finding the best students in a
university based on raw intelligence, or finding athletes based on
physical dimensions. Each use ascriptive classifications (race, intel-
ligence, athleticism) that are rationally related to a given end
(finding criminals, finding the best students, finding the best ath-
letes).
c. The Dignity of the Individual
The antidiscrimination principle's concern with ascription and
irrelevance expresses a concern with the equal dignity of persons.
By prohibiting state action on the basis of arbitrary and irrational
classifications, the antidiscrimination principle expresses the idea
that persons should solely be judged as persons. In other words,
the state should treat persons equally unless there are good rea-
sons not to.
151. That is why scholars that have criticized racial profiling have focused on its subor-
dinating effects rather than on its rationality. E.g., KENNEDY, supra note 50, at 157 ("Race-
dependent policing erodes the difficult-to-maintain habit of individualizing persons and
strengthens the reflex of lumping people together according to gross racial categories. This
reflex has had many disastrous consequences."); David A. Strauss, "Group Rights" and the
Problem of Statistical Discrimination, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002, art. 17, at 7,
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artl7/ (arguing that the "anti-subordination principle at
least begins to explain this intuition" of the harmfulness of racial profiling). For the same
reason, many commentators have focused on the subordinating effects of racially conscious
decision-making in generaL See Sabbagh, supra note 132, at 6 ("Indeed, although Fiss does
not link his 'group-disadvantaging principle' to a defense of color-blindness as a social ideal,
insofar as racial identification itselfremains inextricably bound up with a constellation of ine-
galitarian assumptions, it may be argued that the two should go hand in hand."); Peter H.
Schuck, Groups in a Diverse, Dynamic, Competitive, and Liberal Society: Comments on Owen Fiss's
"Groups and the Equal Protection Clause", IsSUEs IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002, art. 15, at
9, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artl5/ ("At the risk of belaboring the obvious, racial
categories in law have played an utterly pernicious and destructive role throughout human
history."); Richard Thompson Ford, Unnatural Groups: A Reaction to Owen Fiss's "Groups and
the Equal Protection Clause", ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002, art. 12, at 4,
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artl2/ ("But as we implement such remedies, we face a
double bind: the recognition of group difference for remedial purposes always threatens to
reproduce the harm of the production of group difference we set out to remedy in the first
place.").
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The antidiscrimination principle, however, represents more
than just a requirement that the state act rationally. Rather, to dis-
criminate on the basis of irrelevant and ascriptive classifications is,
in effect, to see certain persons in society as somehow less than per-
sons-to see them, in other words, as not worthy, because of their
classification, of the justified action that is accorded other persons
in society. As the Court put it, "[o] ne of the principal reasons race
is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity
and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or
her own merit and essential qualities."'52
This is an important equality concern, a concern that is steeped
in our constitutional tradition.5 3 It is found throughout the
Rehnquist Court's Equal Protection cases-the idea, quoting,
ironically, Shelley v. Kraemer, that the Equal Protection Clause is a
personal right.54 It also forms the basis of Justice Scalia's statement
that "[i]n the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is
American.' ' 5 Justice Scalia's statement does not express an igno-
rance of the reality of classifications such as race of sex. Instead, his
statement expresses an aspiration that, "in the eyes of the govern-
ment," a person's treatment by the state will not depend on such
classifications.'5'
152. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000). Justice Kennedy, in fact, cites Rice for
this proposition in his concurrence in Parents Involved. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2767 (2007) (KennedyJ., concurring).
153. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 11, at 2346-53; Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2428-29.
154. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (citing Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224-25
(1995) (same).
155. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment).
156. One last point about the antidiscrimination principle: it follows from the antidis-
crimination principle's focus on the basis of governmental action that it targets intentional
governmental action. In order to discriminate, the state has to draw lines, and it is this act of
line drawing that the antidiscrimination principle scrutinizes. Fiss, supra note 8, at 109
("[T]he word 'to discriminate,' once divested of its emotional connotation, simply means to
distinguish or to draw a line."). It further follows that the antidiscrimination principle does
not look at unconscious discrimination, because unconscious discrimination is not discrimi-
nation at all. State action that differentially affects persons on the basis of ascriptive and
morally irrelevant characteristics, without more, is not an instance of discrimination-the
state does no prohibited line drawing in these instances. Hence Justice White's statement
that, because the "central purpose" of the Fourteenth Amendment is racial discrimination
by the State, "our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act,
without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional
solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239 (1976). This is not to say that unintentional discrimination is not harmful. See, e.g.,
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimina-
tion and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv.
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2. Discrimination and Affirmative Action
Affirmative action, by definition, almost always presumptively
conflicts with the antidiscrimination principle. This is because af-
firmative action represents a governmental policy of providing
preferential treatment to persons on the basis of classifications
such as race or sex. Such discrimination on the basis of classifica-
tions such as race or sex, without more, violates the
antidiscrimination principle.'
5 7
In order to understand why affirmative action presumptively vio-
lates the antidiscrimination principle, one must turn to the
antidiscrimination principle's transactional perspective and, in par-
ticular, to the transactional perspective's remedial principle.
Again, the antidiscrimination principle's remedial principle is
corrective. It restores the individual harmed by state wrongdoing to
the position he or she occupied before the discrimination. The
transactional perspective considers wrongful discrimination, like
all personal injuries, a tort. And, like all torts, wrongful discrimina-
tion requires a remedy that puts the victim in the place which the
victim occupied before he or she was injured.
58
Under the transactional perspective, the harm that results from
state wrongdoing is a personal harm. It is felt only by the specific
individuals wronged, which, in the case of the antidiscrimination
principle, are the persons discriminated against. It follows that the
persons who are wronged by the state are the only persons who
should receive remedial benefits for their injury. Since the harm is
a personal one, they have special reasons, as the persons who are in
fact injured, to receive compensatory benefits for suffering the
159wrong.
317 (1987). It certainly is, and is a chief concern of the antisubordination principle. But if
the state did not intend the discriminatory consequences, then no discrimination takes place.
157. Not all affirmative action, however, presumptively violates the antidiscrimination
principle. This is because affirmative action may target classifications that are not protected
by the antidiscrimination principle. Affirmative action based on religious affiliation may be
one theoretical example, since one's religious affiliation may be freely chosen yet subordi-
nating. I say "theoretical" because it is difficult to determine a real world example of
affirmative action on the basis of religious affiliation, given current Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (rejecting religious
accommodation interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, overrul-
ing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
158. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 84, at 319-20, 328-32 (noting, and criticizing, compensa-
tory focus of Equal Protection doctrine in the context of race).
159. In contrast, again under affirmative action there is no limit to the range of persons
or institutions it can employ to eradicate subordinating conditions. As noted above, whether
individuals are benefited or burdened will depend solely on their effect on subordination.
See supra Section I(B) (2).
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Moreover, the corrective principle also requires that the state, as
the injurer, be the party responsible for restoring the victim to that
prior position. The state has a special reason to atone for its
wrongdoing because, in committing the wrongdoing, it is respon-
sible for its resulting harm. Thus, the state's role in creating the
discriminatory harm gives the state a special reason to correct the
situation.'60
The corrective principle, therefore, makes a claim about (1) the
persons worthy of remedies and (2) the persons who are responsi-
ble for providing those remedies. In both cases, the corrective
principle limits them to those persons involved in the transaction
in question, specifically (1) the persons harmed and (2) the injur-
161ers.
The corrective principle's emphasis on (1) injurer specificity
and (2) victim specificity dooms any attempt to reconcile affirma-
tive action with the antidiscrimination principle. Consider, for
example, two general strategies that attempt to do so.
a. Aggregation
One can argue that affirmative action is justified because the
persons disadvantaged inhabit social positions that are, in the aggre-
gate, advantaged in society. For example, even if some important
governmental benefits are distributed on the basis of race, this dis-
tribution is benign because, on the whole, the dominant race will
be better situated than the subordinated race.1 62
While it is true that members of an advantaged group are, as a
whole, advantaged by their situation, this fact does not justify deny-
ing individuals that are members of the dominant group
governmental benefits because of their classification as members of
that group. Under the antidiscrimination principle, one cannot
justify denying benefits to one person on the basis of their classifi-
cations just because other persons, similarly classified, are
advantaged. To do so would not take the distinctiveness of persons
seriously, and would result in the classification swallowing the indi-
vidual.
160. Notice, as noted above, that the state can claim an excuse if the reason behind its
actions are not for discriminatory purposes. See supra Section II(A) (1) (b).
161. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical In-
justices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 699 (2003) (noting, in discussing various reparations
initiatives, that "[c]ompensatory justice requires a relationship of identity between the
wrongdoer and payer and a relationship of identity between the victim and claimant").
162. See generally STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996).
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One should not ignore this important point. Cognizing the
harm of the antidiscrimination principle as a case of a dominant
group losing some relative ground ignores the fact that, in most
cases, an individual person is being significantly disadvantaged.
Affirmative action sometimes entails the loss of a low-income job,
16
3
a place at a state university,'6 or the busing of small school children
to non-neighborhood schools.165 We should not take these sacrifices
lightly, even though the persons harmed belong to an advantaged
group. One's classification should not determine how the govern-
ment treats you in society. That is the very evil that the
antidiscrimination principle combats.
One can argue that the sacrifices imposed by affirmative action
are justified because the advantaged person is complicit in the
wrongdoing that created subordination, but this response is simi-
larly flawed.3 6  First, as noted above, subordination is not
necessarily caused by wrongdoing. It can arise naturally, in which
case there is no "wrongdoing" in which to be complicit.
Second, even if wrongdoing is the cause of the subordination at
issue, the person burdened by affirmative action may not be the
wrongdoer. If so, to impose the burdens of affirmative action on
such an innocent individual would be unfair. Again, the antidis-
crimination principle limits the remedy imposed to the injurer
because the injurer is responsible for the discrimination. To attach
culpability to a person because he or she happened to be of the
same race as the actual wrongdoer would be arbitrary and would
represent the very harm the antidiscrimination principle seeks to
combat.
163. E.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
164. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
165. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
166. See, eg., CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARIJ. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAK-
ING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 74 (1997) ("[T]hose Americans who benefit from
white privilege can continue to reap the benefits of that privilege while denying any moral
responsibility for the suffering of others."); Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class
and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 993, 1005-23 (1989) (arguing
against rhetoric of the "innocent victim"); Thbmas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43
VAND. L. REV. 297, 301 (1990) ("[T]he rhetoric of innocence avoids the argument that white
people generally have benefited from the oppression of people of color, that white people
have been advantaged by this oppression in a myriad of obvious and less obvious ways.").
To be fair, Professor Ross argues against the rhetoric of innocence in order to get beyond
it. In his words, "[t]he choice for us is not whether we shall make innocent people suffer or
not; the question is how do we get to a world where good people, white and of color, no
longer suffer because of the accidental circumstances of their race." Ross, supra, at 316. 1 am
quite sympathetic with this notion, especially, as I will argue below, given the fortuity of our
circumstances. But I do not want to discount the burdens imposed on persons who other-
wise have no responsibility for subordination. I do not dismiss "innocence" as rhetoric. It is
something that needs to be addressed in order to be overcome.
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b. History
One can also argue that, because persons have benefited histori-
cally from their position in an advantaged group, denials of
benefits because of affirmative action are benign. This is because,
again, on the whole the individuals similarly classified have been
advantaged by their position in society. Moreover, the historical
argument avoids the fatal error of the aggregate argument by limit-
ing its focus to the individual person. Instead of lumping the
sacrifices of the individual with the group, it aggregates the sacri-
fices of the person with the advantages the person has enjoyed over
time due to his or her advantaged status.
Though it may be the case that, in general, persons classified a
certain way may have been advantaged by their classifications, this
does not provide a justifiable basis for affirmative action, for two
reasons. First, in some cases the persons burdened may not have
individually been advantaged by their classifications. For example,
small children who are bused out of their neighborhood school for
purposes of integrating school systems may not have had the op-
portunity to benefit from their classification at all.
Second, and more importantly, the response fails to take into
account the importance of the transaction at issue. In particular, in
most, though not all cases, past history is completely irrelevant.
Under a transactional perspective what matters are the considera-
tions that govern a specific transaction, and not other things that
lie outside of the transactional frame. 67 For example, one cannot
167. Daryl Levinson suggests, however, that transactional frames can be manipulated so
as to capture such benefits and burdens, and that such framing is fundamentally arbitrary.
Levinson, supra note 22. According to Levinson, "[t]he bottom line is that constitutional and
statutory regulations of government transactions, unlike legal regimes affecting only private
parties, always have the option of aggregating costs and benefits over time, scope, or group
instead of focusing on discrete, individualized interactions. Transactional frames in public
law are always up for grabs." Id. at 1333. Levinson further argues that "U]ust focusing on
affirmative action, it is always possible to manipulate transactional frames in order to rede-
scribe race-based benefits as compensatory, at the individual or group level, for race-based
harm." Id. at 1381.
I disagree. Public law framing, like private law framing, is limited to when aggregation is
contractually or otherwise consensually based. In relational contracts, for example, the un-
ion members agree to aggregate costs and benefits over time. I do not agree, as Levinson
suggests, that persons have a continual relationship with the state that is similar to such a
marriage or union relationship. Id. at 1321-29. Past treatment may offset benefits and bur-
dens in, for example, a marriage (a purchased car may mitigate, for example, a forgotten
anniversary) but I do not think this occurs when the individual confronts the state. Think of
the strangeness, for example, of the state justifying a denial of welfare benefits based on past
preferential treatment in voter registration, or vice-versa. Moreover, consider the perverse
conclusions this would imply-would the state be entitled to screw you over if you dispropor-
tionately benefited in the past?
[VOL. 41:3
Subordination and the Fortuity of Our Circumstances 647
justify denying a person a government job based on his race solely
because, in the past, he had an easier time registering to vote. To
do so would be arbitrary, because the only considerations relevant
to whether the person should receive the job are dictated by the
context of the job opening-in this case, the qualifications of the
candidate compared to the others applying for the job. From a
transactional perspective such historical "benefits" are just as ir-
relevant as the color of a person's skin. This is the sense of Justice
Scalia's statement that "[i]ndividuals who have been wronged by
unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but under
our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a
debtor race."
68
This response purposefully ignores social reality-that is, the
history and social circumstances that have given classifications such
as race the subordinating meaning that they have. The antidis-
crimination principle has been criticized for the narrowness of its
perspective, ' 6 but the criticisms fails to appreciate the nature of the
antidiscrimination principle's transactional perspective and, be-
cause of this, fails to express the appropriate concern for the
sacrificed individual.
The antidiscrimination principle looks not to societal conditions
or historical forces, but to the person standing before the state. Its
sole concern is making sure that the individual's treatment before
the state is justified.
For that reason, the antidiscrimination principle sees what ad-
herents of the antisubordination principle can sometimes fail to
see-that just as the persons within subordinated groups are not
responsible for their social situation, in the absence of wrongdo-
ing, the persons in non-subordinated groups are also not
responsible for their social situation. They too inherited historical
and social circumstances that were not of their own making.
Therefore, it would be unjust, without more, to impose great sacri-
fices on them solely because others are relatively worse off.
In fairness, Levinson rejects the kind of fluid transactional framing that he argues is oth-
erwise limitless, based upon the substantive norms that apply in each case. See id. at 1376
("Thicker accounts of the goals and mechanisms of constitutional norms may provide the
substantive traction necessary to develop sensible approaches to framing.").
168. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis added).
169. See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 11, at 40-46.
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B. The Basis of Obligation
1. Non-Subordination Bases
The equal dignity of persons that underlies the antidiscrimina-
tion principle is a compelling vision of equality. It provides an
important limitation on how the state can treat persons. But, as
described above, it presumptively prohibits how one can address
subordination that is not the result of discrimination, because it
prohibits the preferential treatment necessary to address subordi-
nation.
Proponents of affirmative action have generally relied on two
general strategies to address this tension. Both strategies, while
successful in some instances, are insufficient.
a. Past Discrimination
The first strategy is to presume all subordination is the product
of past discrimination. This presumption makes it appropriate to
remedy the subordinated status of individuals because they are all
victims of this "societal" discrimination.7 0 Furthermore, the use of
the term "societal" implies that the focus should shift away from
pure state action. It suggests that, insofar as persons act through the
state, the real injurer at issue is society itself. "Societal" pierces the
veil of the state.
The concept of "societal discrimination" reflects the normative
importance some scholars have placed on history in subordination,
since in some cases there is a tendency to leverage this causal con-
nection normatively to explain why affirmative action is needed.
170. Justice Brennan takes this view. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 363 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
("[R]elief [from past discrimination] does not require as a predicate proof that recipients of
preferential advancement have been individually discriminated against; it is enough that each
recipient is within a general class of persons likely to have been the victims of discrimination." (empha-
sis added)).
I want to leave to one side the issue of reparations, because the precise claim in the repa-
rations context rests not on subordination but mostly on corrective terms. The idea is to
repay a "debt" for the past enslavement and segregation of blacks in the United States. See,
e.g., RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICANS OWE TO BLACKS (2000). The call for
reparations strains the transactional focus of the antidiscrimination principle, in that it ag-
gregates all victims into one gigantic class and all wrongdoers into one gigantic class. For a
comprehensive discussion of the difficulties regarding reparations, see Posner & Vermuele,
supra note 161.
171. See, e.g., Dana R. Wagner, Facially Neutral Employment Criteria and Title VII: Competing
Frameworks and Notions of Harm, 30 UWLA L. REV. 94, 110-11 (1999) ("[11f such imbalances
manifest themselves, it is natural to suspect that some form of injustice (i.e., some violation
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We want subordination to be the result of wrongdoing because it
makes justifying the burdens of its remedy easier.1
7
2
Relying on societal discrimination as a basis of affirmative ac-
tion, furthermore, has two other advantages. First, persons have a
continuing obligation to help those that have been discriminated
against, allowing affirmative action to apply well past the actual act
of discrimination. In Gaston County v. United States,17 " for example,
the Court held that a facially neutral and fairly administered liter-
acy test for purposes of voter eligibility was invalid because it
disproportionately impacted blacks who were the victims of the
County's dual school system. 174 The Court's injunction against Gas-
ton County's literacy test was not based on wrongdoing on the part
of state election officials at all. The Court accepted as given that
the test was impartially and fairly administered. 75 Rather, the Court
argued that "we cannot escape the sad truth that throughout the
years Gaston County systematically deprived its black citizens of the
educational opportunities it granted to its white citizens. 'Impar-
tial' administration of the literacy test today would serve only to
perpetuate these inequities in a different form."
7
1,
What motivates the Court in Gaston County is the fact that those
voters harmed by Gaston County's prior dual school system were
not fully remedied. The dual school system ensured that each indi-
vidual's literacy level would be significantly lower than a similarly
situated white person. According to the Court, this harm not only
entails that the injurers who inflicted the harm must remedy this
specific injury, but that otherwise perfectly permissible action may
of the antidiscrimination principle) has brought them about.... Thus, a caste-based objec-
tion to an employment pattern is only valid to the extent that it can be translated into a
disparate treatment argument. If an employment pattern is neither the product of nor a
vehicle for disparate treatment, caste theories provide no independent normative basis for
legal intervention."); cf. Ford, supra note 151, at 2 (equating the antisubordination principle
with the antidiscrimination principle, since "arguably the core inquiry remains the same: is
the challenged practice a proxy for or an extension of illegitimate discimination?").
172. Consider, for example, Judith Jarvis Thompson's argument in favor of compensa-
tory affirmative action. Thompson argues that because everyone commonly owns the state,
when persons are discriminated against by state, then the persons responsible for that dis-
crimination are the persons who own the state, namely us. Since they are (or more
appropriately "we are"), in common, owners of societal goods we are also liable, in common,
for any wrongdoing in the allocation of these goods. SeeJudith Jarvis Thompson, Preferential
Hiring, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 19 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1977).
173. 395 U.S. 285 (1968).
174. The action was brought pursuant to provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
which suspended "the use of any test or device as a prerequisite to registering to vote in any
election, in any State or political subdivision which, on November 1, 1964, maintained a test
or device, and in which less than 50% of the residents of voting age were registered on that
date or voted in the 1964 presidential election." Id. at 286-87.
175. Id. at 296.
176. Id. at 296-97 (emphasis added).
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be prohibited if it exacerbates the injury. The Court is quite ex-
plicit that there is a general reason not to "perpetuate these
inequities in a different form."
77
Second, though the injurer may have a special reason to remedy
his or her wrongdoing, there also exists a general reason on the
part of society to remedy the injured. This allows affirmative action
to get around the injurer specificity requirement of the antidis-
crimination principle by relying on this more generalized concern.
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Corp., 78 for example, the Court
upheld an award of retroactive seniority status to black workers
who had previously been discriminated against by their employer
and unions' hiring, transfer, and discharge policies, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.179 The Court affirmed the
district court's order of retroactive seniority despite the fact that
the award would be detrimental to otherwise innocent white work-
ers. Under the award, some workers would have to be subordinated
in seniority to the plaintiffs.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated:
The dissent criticizes the Court's result as not sufficiently cog-
nizant that it will "directly implicate the rights and
expectations of perfectly innocent employees." We are of the
view, however, that the result which we reach today-which,
standing alone, establishes that a sharing of the burden of the past
discrimination is presumptively necessary--is entirely consistent
with any fair characterization of equity jurisdiction, particu-
larly when considered in light of our traditional view that
"[aittainment of a great national policy... must not be confined
within narrow canons for equitable relief deemed suitable by
chancellors in ordinary private controversies."' °
Notice that the burden of remedying those discriminated need
not fall solely on those that committed the wrongdoing. As Justice
Brennan notes, there can also be a "sharing of the burden of past
177. Id. at 297. For a more comprehensive analysis of Gaston County, see Owen M. Fiss,
Gaston County v. United States: Fruition of the Freezing Principle, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 379.
178. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
179. Id. at 750-51.
180. Id. at 777-78 (emphasis added, citations omitted). Justice Brennan also attempts,
though not very convincingly, to downplay the sacrifices of the innocent workers, stating
that "the relief which petitioners seek is only seniority status retroactive to the date of indi-
vidual application, rather than some form of arguably more complete relief," and that
"[c]ertainly there is no argument that the award of retroactive seniority to the victims of
hiring discrimination in any way deprives other employees of indefeasibly vested rights con-
ferred by the employment contract." Id. at 776, 778.
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discrimination" if necessary to remedy those discriminated.'8 In
other words, society itself has a reason to remedy those harmed;
hence Justice Brennan's reference to "[a]ttainment of a great na-
tional policy." 82 Facially he is referring to the "make whole"
provision of Title VII, but he is also making reference to the sig-
nificance of that Act, that it represents a societal commitment to
fully remedy those discriminated against.
3
Despite the advantages of relying on societal discrimination as a
basis for affirmative action, in particular, (1) its imposition of a
continuing obligation to remedy that (2) applies generally to all of
society, we should refrain from finding societal discrimination as
the basis for affirmative action, for two reasons.
First, despite relaxing the injurer specificity requirement, socie-
tal discrimination does not relax the victim specificity requirement
of the antidiscrimination principle. The necessary predicate of the
principle, even when applied generally to society, is wrongdoing-
even though the principle, like affirmative action, imposes obliga-
tions on innocent parties, it only does so if unremedied
wrongdoing exists. In both Gaston County and Franks there were
identifiable victims of clear wrongs.
Affirmative action, in contrast, applies in contexts even where
there is no wrongdoing at all to remedy. Not all members of the
group may have suffered direct discrimination, or even the effects
of direct discrimination. There may exist, for example, individuals
who are members of the group that are not subordinated at all by
the effects of the discrimination (e.g., middle to upper-class
blacks). There may also exist, as in the case of widespread affirma-




183. Franks, in fact, expresses the central deficiency of United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000). Morrison concerned Section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act
("VAWA") that allowed women to bring civil suits in federal court for damages caused by acts
of violence. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, analogized the case to the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Since the federal remedy outlined in VAWA only applies to
violence acts against women by private individuals, it does not address state action, even
though the real purpose of VAWA was to address gender-based disparate treatment by state
authorities. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 624. As Justice Rehnquist writes, "Section 13981 is not
aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might
not itself proscribe; it is directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have
committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias." Id. at 626. Rehnquist ignored the im-
plied principle of Franks, which permits the sharing of burdens to effectuate a national
policy-in Morrison's case, private violence against women. In fact, the burden sharing is
easier because, unlike in Franks, the third parties burdened are not innocent at all
SPRING 2008]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Second, proponents of the "societal discrimination" view suffer
from a larger deficiency-contemporary reality does not support
the presumption that all subordination is caused by past discrimi-
nation. While this may have been the case in the not-too-distant
past with certain groups, today subordination, can, and often does,
come from innocuous (from the point of view of the antidiscrimi-
nation principle) sources. It may come from facially and
impartially administered measures such as efficient employment
criteria' 84 or stricter police enforcement.185
In the above examples it is difficult to say that these policies or
their administrators are racist (or sexist, or other group-ist). There
may exist individual racists implementing these government meas-
ures, but, on the whole, such policies are enacted primarily for
other important and justifiable interests. In the employment con-
text, for example, when an employer uses a hiring practice that
differentially impacts blacks (like a test), one cannot charge that
practice with being racist per se. The employer may in fact be try-
ing to find the best employees, and one must own up to that fact.
The reality of our current situation is that subordination may be, in
a transactional sense, innocent. This does not mitigate the claim of
subordination-it instead forces one to confront subordination
directly.
b. Second Order Justifications
The second strategy looks past state wrongdoing and instead
tries to develop a basis for why the classifications that are important
under affirmative action are relevant. Unlike the past discrimina-
tion strategy, which looks to the reasons persons have to remedy
victims of wrongdoing, this strategy looks to sufficiently general
and universally applicable reasons for imposing the sacrifices that
affirmative action entails. The hope is to identify those "second-
184. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (invalidating aptitude tests
that had a disparate impact upon blacks not shown to be significantly related to successful
job performance).
185. But see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (permitting stops
at permanent checkpoint of drivers based on their "apparent Mexican ancestry"). I hesitate
to discuss the crack/cocaine distinction (where crack penalties are 100 times greater than
those for powder cocaine), because, at least arguably, the persons burdened by this distinc-
tion (blacks) are also those that are benefited by this distinction (blacks). Whether the
advantages outweigh the disadvantages is largely an empirical matter, and I do not want to
speculate on the answer here. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 50, at 375 ("After all, it could be
that increasing the punishment of crack offenders correspondingly benefits those who ob-
tain relief when those offenders are incarcerated.").
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order justifications" that both (1) provide a normative basis for the
discrimination in question and, more importantly, (2) provide a
reason why the persons discriminated against should be unevenly
burdened in the way that they are.
This is the strategy that Justice Powell employs in Bakke. In Bakke
Justice Powell answers the charge of reverse discrimination by ap-
pealing to a value of great charisma, the First Amendment and its
concern with a diversity of viewpoints, to show why the use of the
classification is morally relevant in a medical school context. He
writes that "[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically enu-
merated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special
concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make
its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its stu-
dent body.""' Such universities must be "accorded the right to
select those students who will contribute the most to the 'robust
exchange of ideas."
8 7
Other scholars in favor of affirmative action have used such val-
ues as ensuring democratic ideals of equal participation and
citizenship,' ensuring social stability,' 9 or maintaining and enrich-
ing individual self-actualization, 0 among other things.
It may be the case that, as noted by Owen Fiss, such second-
order justifications are "irreducible," that our best attempt atjusti-
fying affirmative action may be to find as many interests it
instrumentally realizes as possible.'9'
186. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978) (emphasis
added).
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CON-
STITUTION 83 (2005) (discussing Grutter, noting that "[w]hen faced with one interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause that, ... through perceived exclusion, might impede the
functioning of that democracy, is it surprising that the Court majority chose the former?");
Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv.
1, 4 (1977) ("The substantive core of the amendment, and of the Equal Protection Clause in
particular, is a principle of equal citizenship, which presumptively guarantees to each indi-
vidual the right to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and
participating member."); Robert Post, Introduction: After Bakke, in RACE AND REPRESENTA-
TION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 13, 23 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998) (arguing that
affirmative action in higher education is necessary to promote the "health of public cul-
ture," since a healthy public culture is a prerequisite to democratic legitimacy); see also Amar
& Katyal, supra note 20, at 1746 (arguing in favor of "the importance of democratic dialogue
and diversity in public universities" that affirmative action fosters).
189. Fiss, supra note 8, at 151.
190. Id.
191. Fiss notes:
What, it might be asked, is the justification for [the antisubordination principle]? I
am not certain whether it is appropriate to ask this question, to push the inquiry a
step further and search for the justification of that ethic; visions about how society
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But I think we should resist this strategy for two main reasons.
First, it would be difficult to find instrumental reasons sufficiently
compelling to justify all of the different burdens affirmative action
entails. To borrow a Fiss example, the diversity rationale carries
little to no weight when denying a guardrail worker a low-income
job. 92 While it is true that a guardrail worker has no right to ajob,
and that the deprivation is really only an increase in the risk of not
getting the job, this risk is an objectively important risk-it is a
lesser chance of obtaining the very means to live for some low-
skilled workers. Asking these persons to incur this risk in the ser-
vice of diversity in the workplace, however worthy, strikes me as too
much to ask, even offensive.
Second, and more importantly, looking at the antisubordination
principle in such an instrumental way fails to recognize the sense
of equality that the antisubordination principle implicates. It too
expresses an important equality concern, a concern that, at least
vaguely, seems just as important, if not more important, than the
equality concerns of the persons burdened.
There is, therefore, not only justificatory force at issue but also
frankness. We are not really concerned with diversity, or democ-
ratic participation, when we impose the sacrifices of affirmative
action-we are primarily concerned with the plight of the subordi-
nated. In other words, we feel, and should feel, that what is at stake
when we deny a person a place at a university is not just diversity or
democracy or social stability, but the lives and aspirations of the
persons subordinated.
This insight, however, requires careful elaboration, because it
has to be more than just enhancing the position of one group at
the expense of another group. Again, the principal evil the antidis-
should be structured may be as irreducible as visions about how individuals should be
treated-for example, with dignity. But if this second order inquiry is appropriate, a
variety of justifications can be offered and they need not incorporate the notion of
compensation. Changes in the hierarchical structure of society-the elimination of
caste-might be justified as a means of (a) preserving social peace; (b) maintaining
the community as a community, that is, as one cohesive whole; or (c) permitting the
fullest development of the individual members of the subordinated group who oth-
erwise might look upon the low status of the group as placing a ceiling on their
aspirations and achievements.
Id. at 151. Others have taken Fiss to task for failing to provide a sufficient normative basis for
the antisubordination principle. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Alexander, Equal Protection and the
Irrelevance of "Groups", ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002, art. 1, at 4-5,
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art1/.
192. Fiss, supra note 21, at 38 ("The diversity rationale seems shallow, for it lacks the
normative pull necessary to justify the costs inevitably entailed in a system of preferential
treatment. The rationale has little appeal once we move outside the university context, for
example, to the realm of production workers or guardrail contractors.").
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crimination principle targets is that one's benefits or burdens can-
not be based on ascriptive and irrelevant considerations, since to
do so would violate the equal dignity of individuals. But the above
insight is not wholly impermissible-it just requires a foundation
that allows us to see why persons have a reason to take seriously the
plight of subordinated individuals.
What is needed, in other words, is a normative basis that fully
captures why we should care about the subordinated status of indi-
viduals in society, even though we may not be subordinated
ourselves and even if we may not have any other reason or obliga-
tion (stemming either from wrongdoing or any other duty) to help
their condition.
2. The Fortuity of Our Circumstances
a. Solidarity Defined
Our concern with the subordination of social positions arises
from an appreciation of the fortuity of our born-into circum-
stances. When we are born into society, our social position is
randomly assigned to us. Whatever native endowments and social
status we attain at birth are arbitrary, neitherjust nor unjust. This is
a fact of our existence, whatJohn Rawls calls a "moral truism."
93
I view the fortuity of our circumstances as the basis of a solidarity
we have with each other. This solidarity springs not only from the
fact that our born-into circumstances are arbitrary, but that this
"lottery" 94 applies to everyone. No person can evade it.
193. RAWLS, FAIRNESS, supra note 53, at 74.
194. Rawls uses the term "lottery" in criticizing a principle of liberal equality, or a prin-
ciple of distribution based on talent:
[Elven if it works to perfection in eliminating the influence of social contingencies, it
still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by the natural
distribution of abilities and talents. Within the limits allowed by the background ar-
rangements, distributive shares are decided by the outcome of the natural lottery;
and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective. There is no more reason to
permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of
natural assets than by historical and social fortune.
RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 53, § 12, at 64; id. § 17, at 87; see also RAWLS, FAIRNESS, supra
note 53, § 21, at 74-77 (discussing "native endowments as a common asset"). In Rawls' view,
persons are entitled to their personal endowments, see RAwLs, FAIRNESS, supra note 53, § 21,
at 75, but the differences among persons should be viewed as a collective asset, to be used to
the benefit of the whole. Such differences allow persons to "share in the greater social and
economic benefits made possible by the complimentaries of this distribution." RAWLS, THE-
ORY, supra note 53, § 17, at 87. In this way, to use Rawls' words, "a principle [of] justice as
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The (1) arbitrariness and (2) universality of the fortuity of our
born-into circumstances leads to two further conclusions. First, by
acknowledging this shared fate, each person develops an apprecia-
tion of the contingency of his or her own circumstances, since so
much depends on our initial starting place. But for this "lottery,"
we could have occupied any other initial starting position in soci-
ety. Second, and at the same time, the fortuity of our circumstances
gives us a strong reason to care about the circumstances of those
less fortunate. The less fortunate, through no fault of their own,
are made less well-off while others reap a windfall. The only differ-
ence is chance-the less fortunate could have occupied a greater
position, and vice versa.
Taken together, each person, in acknowledging (1) his own con-
tingent situation and (2) the unfortunate circumstances of others,
has a reason to ensure that initial social positions do not foreclose a
person's opportunities to lead a decent life. In other words, there is
a shared concern for others, a solidarity that arises from the conse-
quences of our born-into circumstances, to make sure that our social
structure does not make these initial social positions subordinating.
The deck should not be stacked against anyone at the outset.
The solidarity we feel for persons who have lost out in this lottery
is analogous to the solidarity we feel for others who suffer from
other arbitrary, universal, and unfortunate events. We care about the
victims of natural disasters, or persons with disabilities, because we
know that, but for our circumstances, we could have occupied those
positions. Because of the inherent (though non-blameworthy) un-
fairness of these situations, we try to structure society to remove it.
The same sense of counteracting misfortune also applies to the
damage (in particular, the subordination) caused by the fortuity of
our circumstances.
fairness does the work of political philosophy as reconciliation." RAWLS, FAIRNESS, Supra
note 53, § 21, at 76. For a similar discussion of the significance of the moral lottery to Rawls's
theory ofjustice, see Samuel Scheffler, What isEgalitarianism?, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5 (2003).
Rawls's broader concern is the justification of principles ofjustice that apply to the basic
structure of society. See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 53, § 3, at 10. His invocation of the moral
lottery is used to justify one such principle, the difference principle, by diminishing the
strong moral entitlement to one's natural endowments implied by the principle of liberal
equality.
In contrast, my project is to define a principle, the antisubordination principle, which
addresses a specific unjust social condition. My account does not attempt to justify broader
principles of justice. See infra Conclusion. My account, in fact, is agnostic as to whether
Rawls' principles of justice, or any other principle of justice (even a principle of liberal
equality), should apply. Moreover, my invocation of the moral lottery plays a different role; it
does not diminish one's entitlement to his or her natural endowments but serves as a basis for
solidarity with others. See infra note 195 and accompanying text (distinguishing my view of
solidarity from entitlement views). It shows our connection to each other.
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A solidarity interpretation of the fortuity of our circumstances
does not concern the extent to which persons are entitled to their
initial starting places. 195 Instead, the analysis shifts to ensuring that
any initial starting places are not subordinating ones. This shift, in
other words, is from the distribution of goods to the eradication of
subordinating social positions. The eradication of subordinating
social positions may entail the redistribution of certain goods, but
that redistribution does not result in a judgment that the persons
who lose out do not properly deserve what they previously had.
They may, in fact, legitimately deserve what they had. Instead, a
solidarity interpretation of the fortuity of our circumstances ap-
peals to our common situation, and ask us to consider those
disadvantaged by the fortuity of our circumstances. Even if one has
legitimate entitlements to what he or she has, for whatever reason,
that person still has reason to sacrifice those entitlements.
A solidarity interpretation of the fortuity of our circumstances
also differs from social insurance theory. Social insurance also in-
volves arbitrary consequences that can affect us all, such as
accidents or catastrophic illness. Social insurance, however, is an ex
ante measure, since it serves as a method to deal with risks that
could affect each person in the future. Under any given social in-
surance scheme, persons pool their resources so that the costs of
these risks do not disproportionately fall only on one or a few per-
196sons.
For this reason, the normative basis of social insurance is pruden-
tial, since no person would have any reason to be involved in a
social insurance scheme unless there is a risk that any of the out-
comes protected by the social insurance scheme could actually
195. Ronald Dworkin takes such an entitlement view, arguing for a theory of "equality
of resources" in which the only justified inequalities are those based upon life-style choices.
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 76-83, 92-
99 (2000). This entitlement view of the fortuity of our circumstances is also associated with
proponents of a view of "luck egalitarianism," who believe that goods should not be distrib-
uted based upon brute luck. See, e.g., SUSAN L. HURLEY, JUSTICE, LUCK AND KNOWLEDGE
(2003); Richard Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Wefare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77
(1989); G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906 (1989). For a cri-
tique of luck egalitarianism, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109
ETHICS 287 (1999); Samuel Scheffier, Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality, 4 POL.
PHIL. & ECON. 5 (2005); Samuel Scheffler, What is Egalitarianism?, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5
(2003). Interestingly enough, Dworkin disputes being categorized as a luck egalitarian,
though he does share the core insight that justification of inequalities rests on choice, not
on luck, the very essence of what I call the entitlement view. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Equality,
Luck, and Hierarchy, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 190 (2003).
196. This is distinct from Ronald Dworkin's conception of a "hypothetical insurance
market," which attempts to impose an "ex ante" perspective on an (necessarily) ex post
situation. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 195, 76-83, 92-99. I am concerned here with actual
social insurance schemes, and how they are different from the solidarity I am outlining here.
SPRING. 2008]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
affect that person. To use a private insurance example, there is no
reason to purchase auto liability insurance if one does not own or
drive a car. Social insurance programs thus tend to apply only to
those consequences that affect everyone. Social Security's popular-
ity can be explained, in part, by the fact that everyone suffers a risk
of poverty as they become more elderly.
A solidarity interpretation of the fortuity of our circumstances,
however, differs because it relies on an ex postjudgment. The lot-
tery has already happened, and there is nothing we can do, ex
ante, to mitigate its risks. Moreover, for some subordinated social
positions, most notably race, persons have no risk whatsoever of
occupying them.
97
The normative basis, in other words, is fraternal, not prudential.
It is borne out of our regard for others, rather than an individualis-
tic regard for one's own welfare. This regard, in turn, arises from
an understanding and appreciation of our common fate. Since we
are all subject to the social and natural forces that assign each of us
to our initial starting places, which are all beyond our individual
control, we realize the role chance plays in our lives. This apprecia-
tion, coming after the fact, gives us reason to mitigate the
damage-to both alleviate the damage caused to those born to
subordinated social positions, and to ensure that the damage does
not occur again. Hence the solidarity I am describing represents an
appropriate basis for a public obligation. It reflects a deep concern
for everyone in society by everyone in society.
Consider again, by analogy, the concern we feel for persons who
have suffered from natural disasters. As in the fortuity of our born-
into circumstances, our reasons to help are ex post-we cannot
create a scheme to prevent a natural disaster that has already hap-
pened. In addition, the reasons for helping are not self-regarding.
While some people may help out of a desire to ensure that others
will do the same for them in the future, I do not think that accu-
rately reflects the reason why many do, in fact, help out. Rather,
the reason lies in a need to mitigate the damage done by nature to
others. It is strictly other-regarding. Consider, for example, the
spontaneous outpouring for the victims of Hurricane Katrina. To
say that persons feel this concern out of a self-regarding, rational
197. This explains the differences in treatment between subordinated groups on the
basis of race or sex and those based upon a disability. Our concern with the disabled stems
both from the kind of solidarity considerations I outline above and the prudential reasons
that underlie social insurance. As Owen Fiss noted, "[t]he Americans with Disabilities Act
sailed through Congress, with little or no resistance, perhaps because the disadvantaged
group is, unlike blacks or women, one of which anyone might have become a member." Fiss,
supra note 64, at 14.
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desire to ensure equal treatment strikes me as both far-fetched and
offensive.
Social disasters, of which subordination is one of them, deserve
the same response. It too, like natural disasters, should evoke our
concern for the damage they cause. No one deserves to be hit by
an earthquake or a hurricane. It just happens. No one is to blame.
Similarly, no one deserves to suffer the subordinating effects of be-
ing black or a woman. For the most part, itjust happens. No one is
to blame. We therefore have a reason to mitigate these conse-
quences, no matter if they are natural or social in origin.
b. The Sacrifices of Those Burdened
The fortuity of our circumstances cuts both ways. It provides a
basis to remedy the situation of those subordinated, but it also re-
quires us to temper the sacrifices taken to end that subordination.
In almost all cases, those burdened, like those subordinated, had
no role in the resultant subordination, and for that reason can
claim an arbitrariness to the sacrifices imposed. Why me, instead of
someone else?
This question does not foreclose measures like affirmative ac-
tion, but sets in motion a conversation between those burdened
and those subordinated. At this level of discussion, one cannot say
much about the outcomes of these conversations, since the particu-
larities of each situation will play a determinative role. But a few
general principles will guide the outcome.
First, preference should be given to sacrifices that can be dis-
persed as widely as possible. Since subordination is a public
concern, the price to pay should not, if practicable, fall on only
one or a few individuals. This suggests a slight preference for af-
firmative action that does not single out a few individuals, such as
increased recruitment efforts, which disperse its costs along an in-
stitution or the public, over strict quotas, which tend to single out a
small group of individuals.
Dispersal, however, should not override a second principle, one
of efficacy. Consider, for example, appeals to increased funding of
elementary education as a preferred method to deal with "pool"
problems, that is, the lack of qualified minority candidates for
certain positions of power. 9" This form of affirmative action has an
198. E.g., Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1745,
1768, 1770, 1814 n.296 (1989) (arguing for attacking the underlying social conditions, par-
ticularly the class stratification, that reduce the pool of minority applicants).
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appeal that derives not only from its dispersed nature but from its
suggestion that it is targeting a "root cause" of the pool problem. '
Fixing the pool problem, however, may require more than just
throwing money at the "root cause." In fact, studies have suggested
that increased funding of inner-city schools has had little effect.
20 0
Efficacy may demand, instead, hiring preferences for qualified
minority candidates to address a different dimension that funding
does not reach-increasing the perceived possibilities of the mi-
nority group. Members of the group may not have the self-regard
necessary to do the further work (often considerable) to be a part
of most pools. This is one of the central insights of Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Grutter, where, as I noted earlier, Justice
O'Connor stresses the importance that positions of power "be visi-
bly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity.',201
Third, one must acknowledge the sacrifices imposed, especially
when they are severe, and employ countermeasures to ensure that
the sacrifices remain reasonable. In the employment context, for
example, hiring preferences given to those subordinated can be
tied to more robust anti-poverty measures for those burdened,
such as increased unemployment insurance.02 Again, as I noted
above, the inter-institutional perspective of affirmative action al-
lows for this, only this time in the service of those sacrificed.
c. Plyler v. Doe
It may seem odd to base the antisubordination principle and, in
turn, affirmative action on such a highly abstract social fact as the
fortuity of our circumstances. But it not only provides a normative
basis for taking seriously the social position of others, but also pro-
vides an explanation for why we do care, in some cases, so strongly
199. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 11, at 471 ("If I had to choose, I would probably
vote to scrap the entire patchwork of affirmative action measures in this country in favor of a
massive capital infusion into inner-city day care and educational facilities."); Schuck, supra
note 150, at 82-83 (discussing such "root cause" measures, and concluding that "[tbo the
extent that the academic performance of low-income children can be improved by remedia-
tion and educational reform, this is clearly the road that we should travel-and hopefully are
traveling--even as we search for other ways to improve their life prospects").
200. SeeJames E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 286-95 (1999) (citing
studies that note the inefficacy of increased expenditures on segregated schools).
201. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (emphasis added).
202. A similar situation arises in takings situations, where the property interests of the
few are sacrificed for a public purpose, though under takings law the public purpose does
not have to be a subordination purpose.
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for them. Consider, for example, Plyler v. Doe,0° where the Court
enjoined the state of Texas from denying elementary education to
illegal immigrant children. After concluding that the children were
"persons" under the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Brennan
concludes that the state should be enjoined, despite the fact that
the children are illegally in the United States, because:
Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring en-
try into this country ... raises the specter of a permanent
caste of undocumented aliens, encouraged by some to remain
here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the
benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful
residents.
The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special
members of this underclass. Persuasive arguments support the
view that a State may withhold its beneficence from those
whose very presence within the United States is the product of
their own unlawful conduct.... But the children of those il-
legal entrants are not comparably situated. Their "parents
have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms,"
and presumably the ability to remove themselves from the
State's jurisdiction; but the children who are plaintiffs in these
cases "can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own
status." Even if the State found it expedient to control the
conduct of adults by acting against their children, legislation
directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his chil-
dren does not comport with fundamental conceptions of
justice....
Of course, undocumented status is not irrelevant to any
proper legislative goal. Nor is undocumented status an abso-
lutely immutable characteristic since it is the product of
conscious, indeed unlawful, action. But [the statute in ques-
tion] is directed against children, and imposes its
discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic
over which children can have little control. It is thus difficult
to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these
203. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981).
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children for their presence within the United States. Yet that
appears to be precisely the effect of [the statute] *204
In this remarkable passage Justice Brennan expresses two differ-
ent concerns. The first is a claim that the children are improperly
discriminated against, despite their unlawful entry into the coun-
try, because the status of the children burdened is, like race,
ascriptive and irrelevant. The children's status is ascriptive because
"the children who are plaintiffs in these cases 'can affect neither
their parents' conduct nor their own status,"' even though one's
illegal status is not purely immutable. °5
Justice Brennan furthermore argues, though implausibly, that
the classification is morally irrelevant, that it is "difficult to con-
ceive of a rational justification for penalizing these children for
their presence within the United States."2 0 6 As Justice Burger's dis-
sent points out, restricting education in this way "serves to prevent
undue depletion of its limited revenues available for education, 20 7
since at stake is the educational interests of children who are here
legally. Justice Burger's point is that if state agencies must take into
account the children of other countries who do not contribute re-
sources (in the form of property taxes) for education, then it
makes every child worst off educationally. The State of Texas can-
not educate the world. It has to make distinctions. And it can
rationally prefer the children of parents who pay taxes to fund that
education.20 Sjustice Brennan's discrimination argument in favor of
209)the children, therefore, seems misplaced .
But a second concern lurks within this passage-the subordi-
nated condition of the parents. Brennan recognizes that there exists
an appropriate basis for denying the parents state benefits since
their status is based on their own illegal conduct. As Brennan
notes, "[p]ersuasive arguments support the view that a State may
withhold its beneficence." 21 0 Despite these arguments, however, Jus-
204. Id. at 218-20 (citations omitted).
205. Id. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 249 (BurgerJ., dissenting).
208. Moreover, "the Texas law could not be invalidated under the antidiscrimination
principle because it could be rationally justified as a means to serve a legitimate social pur-
pose, specifically, to discourage the influx of illegal immigrants .... " Owen M. Fiss, The
Immigrant as Pariah, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS 3, 11 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds.,
1999).
209. To be fair, Justice Brennan also identifies the children's plight as an antisubordina-
tion concern, particularly in his concern with the Texas law creating a "subclass of
illiterates." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. Fiss also notes this antisubordination strand of Justice
Brennan's opinion. See Fiss, supra note 208, at 12.
210. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219.
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tice Brennan still takes their plight seriously. Implicit in Brennan's
recognition of the parents' need to find work in the U.S. is an ac-
knowledgment that the social position of illegal immigrants places
them in a difficult position. They must either live in poverty in
their home country or risk illegal action as a means of supporting
themselves and their families. They represent, forJustice Brennan,
the possibility of a "permanent caste of undocumented workers"
forced in this position but societally ignored, with the children
themselves "special members of [an] underclass.""'
Justice Brennan's use of the term "caste" is significant because it
shows that he recognizes the parents' peculiarly subordinated con-
dition. They are ascribed into a status of undocumented workers
(they, of course, did not pick the country they were born into),
they risk either starvation or illegal sanction, and their status as
undocumented workers does not seem to be relevant, from a
moral point of view, to their overall welfare. Hence Justice Bren-
nan's observation that they are, as cheap labor, "encouraged by
some to remain ... but nevertheless denied the benefits that our
society makes available to citizens and lawful residents."
2 1 2
I therefore believe that Justice Brennan is just as touched by the
fact that the parents are forced to resort to illegal action for them-
selves and their children as the plight of the children themselves. I
also believe, given the facts, that our own feelings point, and
should point, in the same direction. These feelings flow from an
appreciation that we are lucky not to occupy such a situation, born
into a country that cannot provide for us and rejected by another
that can. Though Equal Protection doctrine prevented Justice
Brennan from addressing the parents' claims directly, he does his
best to help them by ensuring their children have access to a de-
cent education.
Recognition of the fortuity of our circumstances applies power-
fully not only to the "perpetual underclass" of illegal immigrants,
but to a vast number of contexts where, because of subordinating
conditions, persons are disadvantaged in society. It applies equally
to persons born with the wrong skin, wrong gender, or born in the
wrong neighborhood. When we care about the plight of disadvan-
taged groups in society, the basic concern of affirmative action, I
think this thought process applies. In most, if not all, cases we are
not remedying wrongful acts, we are caring about a status they have
in society that was imposed on them, and how, we too, could have
211. Id. at 218-19.
212. Id. at 219.
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suffered the same indignity but for the fortuity of our circum-
stances.
CONCLUSION
I want to conclude by briefly discussing the relationship of the
antisubordination principle to welfare rights.
Extending the antisubordination principle to encompass welfare
rights implicates one of principle's most stringent demands, what
Owen Fiss calls "interdependence." 21 3 Earlier, in discussing the re-
quirement of ascription, I had argued in favor of interdependence,
that the claim of subordination must be caused by one's social po-
sition. This insistence on interdependence makes it difficult to
conceive of the poor as a protected class under the antisubordina-
tion principle. This is because, in most cases, the status of the poor
as disadvantaged in society does not depend on a process of ascrip-
tion but on other factors, such as one's life choices and conduct.
One cannot say that one's poor status is ascribed if, for example,
one's status depended on going to law school rather than business
school, because there is not the sense that one's status was imposed
based on one's membership in a disfavored group. This is not to
say that poverty cannot be an ascribed class,214 but that an inquiry
into whether poverty is ascriptive will depend on whether poverty
itsef plays a role in one's place in society.2
213. Fiss, supra note 64, at 20-21 ("The most important criterion for the social groups
on which I focused is interdependence, by which I meant that the status of individuals is
inextricably linked to the status of groups with which they are identified.").
214. In historically aristocratic societies where one's social class largely determined
one's prospects in society, class formed a caste system. For an account of such a society in the
context of early American history, see generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1991).
215. See, e.g., Sabbagh, supra note 132, at 4 ("To take but one example, in the United
States, while poverty surely curtails an individual's life prospects to a considerable extent, the
matrix of such disadvantage lies in the very fact of being poor-not in the fact of being per-
ceived as belonging to the group of 'the poor.'"); Young, supra note 30, at 3 ("It is
conceivable for persons to be poor in economic terms and still have stature and dignity in
their communities; many a Horatio Alger story invokes the image of such persons.").
Although this should be the subject of its own article, I believe that there is something to
the notion that poverty itself constitutes a form of subordination, given the increase in ine-
quality in the United States and the prevalence of income volatility. Much of the work of
Lani Guinier, for example, has been to provide an argument in favor of poverty as a form of
subordination, a subordination that race actually blinds us to by dividing poor blacks and
poor and working-class whites. Guinier argues that we should recognize that "racialized
hierarchies mirror the distribution of power and resources in the society more generally."
Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91J. AM. HIST. 92 (2004); see also GUINIER & TORRES, supra note
64. My only narrow point here is that to the extent poverty is a subordinated position will
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A move towards welfare rights suggests a relaxation of the neces-
sity of this requirement, as welfare rights are not predicated on
one's subordinated position. Even under means-tested schemes, all
one has to show is that one meets the eligibility requirements,
namely that one is (for the moment) poor.
Owen Fiss welcomes this relaxation of the interdependence re-
quirement. For Fiss the interdependence requirement suggests an
individualist telos to the antisubordination principle: "In protect-
ing groups we protect individuals, and often we must protect
groups in order to protect individuals. 2 " Fiss, however, shifts his
focus to an independent, communal value. We care about subordi-
nation not only because it disadvantages individuals, but because
"[i] t disfigures society."
21 7
I have much sympathy for Fiss's appeal to community, and the
theory of solidarity I derive from the fortuity of our circumstances
is my own attempt to develop the content of such a communal,
public value. I, however, do not favor a relaxation of the interde-
pendence requirement, for three reasons.
First, the interdependence requirement plays an important role
in understanding the structural nature of the claim of subordina-
tion. Interdependence distinguishes subordination from the mere
fact of being poor or otherwise disadvantaged. The disadvantage
under subordination is the disadvantage of a social position that
keeps one nearly permanently disadvantaged, with little to no op-
tions for escape.Is It triggers the structural perspective that the
antisubordination principle takes, looking beyond the current cir-
cumstances of a given individual to see if there is something about
the social structure that is causing the individual's circumstances. To
relax the interdependence requirement leaves the antisubordina-
tion principle unmoored to social structure and leaves its structural
perspective unjustified.
Second, the interdependence requirement is important norma-
tively because it helps to delineate the urgency of those subordinated.
Those subordinated not only have it worse off, but they are con-
signed to be worse off, probably forever. The urgency presented
by subordination, moreover, entails priority. Those subordinated
should have a preferred place in society over those merely disad-
depend on its effects independent of other causes that might have led someone into pov-
erty.
216. Fiss, supra note 64, at 20.
217. Id.
218. This sense of structural disadvantage is what Fiss had in mind when he distin-
guished the disadvantage of blacks from those of the poor generally, since, "[i]n a sense,
they are America's perpetual underclass." Fiss, supra note 8, at 150.
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vantaged, since, by definition, those subordinated have little in the
mode of self-help. Hence the interdependence requirement serves
as an important signaling function, as it allows us (along with the
other elements of subordination I outline above) to identify those
in most need of assistance.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the urgency of subordina-
tion combines the public with the individual. As I noted above, our
public, communal concern for subordination derives from a soli-
darity we have with those subordinated, based upon our own
recognition of the fortuity of our born-into circumstances. But for
our good fortune, we ourselves could have been subordinated, and
vice versa. Therefore, the communal value in ending subordina-
tion derives precisely from its effects on individuals. There is no
need to distinguish the two, as one, in fact, flows from the other.19
It is this concern with the individualist consequences of subor-
dination that can provide a basis for the antisubordination
principle's concern with welfare rights. The antisubordination
principle not only directs us to do more than end existing subor-
dination. It also gives us reason to act more proactively, by taking a
forward-looking approach to subordination without waiting for
subordination to emerge. For example, many laws are designed to
avoid concentrations in wealth that could lead to future subordina-
tion. Many of the restrictions in alienability in property law, for
example, can be understood as attempts to prevent the kind of
concentration in land ownership that resulted in earlier feudal so-
cieties. 2 0 Likewise, many anti-poverty welfare rights, such as food
stamps or the Earned Income Tax Credit, can be understood to
have a structural dimension. Such rights are designed to prevent
the emergence of an underclass, regardless of its eventual shape or
form. 2 ' Rather than wait for subordination to happen, we can set
up the law in a way that makes it difficult for subordination to take
root. Here our concern with welfare rights remains just as strong
without any need to diffuse the concept of subordination.222
219. Cf Fiss, supra note 64, at 22-23.
220. SeeJoseph William Singer, Things that We Would Like to Take for Granted: Minimum
Standards for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV.
(forthcoming 2008); cf Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 72 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1237, 1243 (2005) (conceptualizing property as a device to promote human free-
dom).
221. Anti-poverty measures can also be understood as a form of affirmative action inso-
far as they eradicate the subordination of existing subordinated positions.
222. For example, why not give each child born in America $100,000? For a more thor-
ough treatment of a similar policy proposal, see BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANN ALSTOT-r, THE
STAKEIHOLDER SOCIETY (2000), which argues for a one time grant of $80,000 to each child
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Admittedly, this forward-looking view of the antisubordination
principle will result, in contrast to Mark Tushnet, in making wel-
fare rights "peripheral" to the antisubordination principle. It will
have an obvious importance to the goal of ending subordination,
but it will not directly address the principle's most urgent con-
cerns. Welfare rights are prophylactic, no more. Tushnet, and
possibly Fiss, probably would not accept such a secondary view of
welfare rights to the antisubordination principle.
But why? Does the antisubordination principle have to justify
everything? Broader principles of justice can provide sufficient
grounding for welfare rights. Moreover, the solidarity I derive from
the fortuity of our born-into circumstances need not limit itself to
subordination. It gives us reason to care more broadly about the
welfare of society, regardless of the structural nature of that disad-
vantage. The content of these principles of justice will require far
more extensive treatment than I can provide here, but the elabora-
tion of these principles need not come at the expense of the
antisubordination principle.224
Throughout this Article I have talked about the antisubordina-
tion principle largely in the abstract, without directly addressing
issues of implementation and, ultimately, interpretation, since my
ultimate goal is to enshrine the antisubordination principle within
the Equal Protection Clause. It is an Article in ideal theory. For
now I offer my thoughts on the antisubordination principle as a
further way station, bringing us closer to the goal of a robust anti-
subordination doctrine. Now, compared to a generation ago, we
are profoundly aware of the interconnectedness of our circum-
stances and the power we can wield in changing the structure of
our society. The only humble thought I offer is that, when we re-
flect on our place in society and the plight of others, what animates
us is the thought that "there, but for the grace of God, go I."
with a high school diploma on his or her twenty-first birthday. I thank Randall Kennedy for
this suggestion.
223. Mark V. Tushnet, The Return of the Repressed: Groups, Social Welfare Rights, and the
Equal Protection Clause, IssuEs IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2002, art. 7, at 6,
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art7/.
224. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969) (examining constitutional welfare rights in light of
John Rawls's theory ofjustice).
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